

Lessons Learning Review of Movement
Coordination in Operations
Strengthening Movement Coordination and
Cooperation (SMCC) Ukraine and Pakistan

Final Report

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Acronyms and abbreviations

APRO	IFRC Asia-Pacific Regional Office
CoD	Council of Delegates
DREF	Disaster Response Emergency Fund
EIL	Efficiency, Impact and Localisation
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
GVA	Geneva
HNS	Host National Society/Societies
HoD	Heads of Delegation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IR	Inception Report
KI	Key Informant
KII	Key Informant Interview
LLR	Lessons Learning Review
MCA	Movement Coordination Agreement
MCO	Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisor ¹
MCP	Movement Contingency Plan
MEOPS	Movement Emergency Operation Platform
MIT	Movement Implementation Team
MSA	Movement Security Agreements
NS	National Society/Societies
PNS	Partner National Society
PoA	Plan of Action
PRCS	Pakistan Red Crescent Society
QA	Quality Assurance
RCRC	Red Cross and Red Crescent
RO	Regional Office
SC	Steering Committee
SMCC	Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation
ToR	Terms of Reference
URCS	Ukraine Red Cross Society

¹ Previously 'Movement Coordination Officer'.

Executive summary

The subject matter of this lessons learning review is the Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) initiative. SMCC aims to improve the way Movement partners work together and enhance coordination and cooperation, especially in response to medium to large-scale emergencies. The SMCC initiative is anchored in the Statutes of the Movement which affirm that all partners shall cooperate with each other according to their roles defined by their respective mandates. The roles and responsibilities, as well as the interaction between Movement partners are therefore defined by the Seville Agreement 2.0.

The six SMCC Priority areas may be summarised as:

1. Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management
2. Pursuing the development of the interoperability of systems
3. Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components
4. Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing existing SMCC tools
5. Promoting complementary domestic and international response
6. Enhancing the scalability of the response

Efforts to work together better as a Movement are not new. The process to strengthen coordination and cooperation within the Movement gained significant momentum in 2013, with the adoption of Resolution 4 at the Council of Delegates (CoD) in Sydney, Australia. This launched a comprehensive and inclusive Movement-wide consultation process in 2014–2015, with the participation of over 140 National Societies (NSs).

The results of the consultations and ensuing recommendations were presented to the 2015 CoD in a progress report² which identified the necessity of enhanced Movement coordination in humanitarian crises and a strong willingness among Movement components to work together to fulfil the Movement's common goals. This positive momentum and spirit are reflected in Resolution 1³, which was adopted by consensus at the CoD in 2015 and tasked the Movement with implementing the SMCC Plan of Action (PoA) for 2015–2017.⁴

By 2017, the initiative had gained significant momentum, improving the Movement's capacity for efficient large-scale emergency responses. Directly supported by over 40 NSs, implementation of SMCC has initiated a gradual change process and fostered a positive "SMCC spirit" among Movement components, positioning the Movement on the "front foot" in the evolving humanitarian ecosystem.⁵ A significant achievement has been the development of the SMCC Toolkit⁶ endorsed by CoD resolutions in 2013, 2015, 2017 and 2019, and its subsequent incorporation into the Seville Agreement 2.0 - thereby institutionalising the use of SMCC tools.

From the onset of SMCC in 2013, mainly anecdotal evidence has been gathered from the implementation of Movement coordination in operations and it has been difficult to measure the results of the initiative. Subsequently, it was agreed to gain more substantive evidence of what is working and what is hampering Movement coordination through learning lessons from two main Movement operational responses - Ukraine (a conflict response) and Pakistan (a disaster response) - which have either started after and/or continued after the adoption of the new normative framework, the Seville Agreement 2.0.

2 https://rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2015/03/CoD15_SMCC_report-FINAL-EN.pdf

3 https://rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2015/03/CoD15-R1-SMCC_EN.pdf

4 IFRC. Progress Report Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation. CD/17/5. Q3 2017.

5 *ibid.*

6 <https://smcctoolkit.org/>

The purpose of the review was to highlight best practices and identify challenges of Movement coordination in large-scale emergencies and to inform areas for improvement. The specific review objectives were to:

- Assess the extent to which Movement components are fulfilling their commitments to SMCC in emergency operations and across the SMCC initiative.
- Identify whether the SMCC Ambitions are relevant and how they have been fulfilled in both selected emergencies.
- Identify key SMCC enablers and challenges at country, regional and headquarters levels.
- Assess the relevance of SMCC guidance and tools used to support Movement coordination.
- Propose recommendations for strengthening SMCC implementation in current and future responses to crises.

The review was commissioned by Members of the Steering Committee of the SMCC process. The primary audience for this review is the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) leadership and senior management, leadership of NSs involved in the response contexts, plus the Movement as a whole as signatories to the SMCC initiative. The review will contribute to informing and framing the way forward for Movement coordination in future large-scale emergencies and be used to report on SMCC implementation during the current CoD period.

The review was conducted between June and November 2023 by an independent external consultant. The review method combined a literature review with sixty-one (61) semi-structured interviews (ICRC 12 female, 15 male; IFRC 9 female, 13 male; Partner National Society (PNS) 2 female, 5 male; Host National Society (HNS) staff, 1 female, 4 male). SMCC country case studies were developed for both contexts.

The countries selected for the review in terms of a Movement Coordination context were very different in type. Ukraine exhibited Movement Coordination in its fullest form, with a complex intertwining of the HNS, IFRC, ICRC and PNSs, whereas Pakistan was a context exhibiting primarily Membership Coordination (HNS, IFRC and PNSs) with very limited ICRC engagement other than in its exclusive geographical area of operation (and was thus not representative of a collective response context). In Ukraine, SMCC tools and processes were employed extensively (benefiting from being an original SMCC laboratory since 2016), whereas in Pakistan few tools or processes were employed.

The synthesis of review findings and key learnings is as follows:

Priority 1 - Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management: while Ukraine fared considerably better than Pakistan in terms of effective data sharing modalities largely due to the IFRC's GO Platform⁷, the overall limited level of data sharing between partners in both contexts weighed negatively on efforts to establish accurate Movement footprints and improve operational response. There were no SMCC joint outcome/impact indicators at the strategic level, which inhibited opportunity to better guide the operational responses and indicate the 'collective' intended positive outcomes for affected populations. Coordinating ICRC and IFRC appeals proved a challenging process due to different budgeting/financing modalities.

Summarised learnings:

1. A lack of open data sharing between partners negatively weighs on efforts to establish accurate Movement footprints and improve operational response.

⁷ <https://go.ifrc.org>

2. Different IFRC and ICRC budgeting processes make coordinating appeals challenging.
3. The high amounts of funding pouring into Ukraine and the pressure on PNSs to have visibility in high profile areas was predictable.
4. SMCC potential is being limited by a lack of joint outcome/impact indicators.
5. A HNS with good SMCC understanding is in a stronger position to coordinate its partners.

Priority 2 - Pursuing the development of the interoperability of systems: the SMCC PoA represented a strong tangible, collective effort to address key systemic interoperability challenges with both Logistics/Supply Chain and Surge making good progress towards PoA objectives. In both contexts, good interoperability practice was exhibited by joint IFRC and ICRC Logistics and Supply Chain coordination, thus ensuring agile and flexible support to operations. Delays in finalising the resource mobilisation table in Ukraine primarily due to IFRC/ICRC alignment challenges negatively impacted early interoperability aspirations and weighed on response efficiency and effectiveness in the early stages (later stages were considerably improved).

Summarised learnings:

1. Logs interoperability objectives and activities provide a useful template for other Movement Implementation Team (MIT) interoperability aspirations, contributing to a more strategized Priority 2.
2. Improving resource mobilisation table processes and early cross-institution alignment is key to interoperability and securing a more effective/efficient response.

Priority 3 - Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components: in neither contexts were Movement Contingency Plans (MCPs) developed to any meaningful extent prior to the emergencies and thus had limited utility at emergency/crisis onset. MIT work related to understanding/unpacking the use of relevant Movement capacities/competencies has lacked traction. Combined, this has led to a limited understanding of Movement component capacity to effectively respond to the emergencies, and a less than clear, collective Movement SMCC coordination position to guide operations, and support partners to provide a more coherent response.

Summarised learnings:

1. The initial lack of IFRC/ICRC 'coordination positioning' clarity affected the partners ability to provide a more coherent response.
2. MCPs are not thorough – this limits real time understanding of how capacities of Movement components can be utilised to contribute to a response.
3. Few review key informants expected MCPs to have utility.

Priority 4 - Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing existing SMCC tools - and the review 'deep dive': operational response efficiency and effectiveness was greatly enhanced where SMCC tools were used and contributed to increased accountability levels. Mini-Summits and Joint Statements were amongst the most relevant and valuable tools to frame the initial emergency response. The extent to which NSs fulfilled their convenor roles differed considerably between the two contexts, with the Ukraine Red Cross Society (URCS) taking a much fuller and lead role in contrast to the Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) which played no role (noting that the emergency in Pakistan took place just after the approval of the Seville Agreement 2.0 and the change in PRCS leadership took place in the midst of the operation).

SMCC initiative conceptual understanding was strongest at Geneva levels and weakest at branch levels. In Pakistan, effective SMCC preparation and application was hampered by relatively new NS senior management/leadership understanding and buy-in for the initiative, as well as the emergency taking place just after the approval of the Seville Agreement 2.0. Although MCP's were not developed to an extent that conveyed full Movement contingency capacity, and held limited utility in this regard, the associated planning processes were seen as valuable contributors to preparedness arrangements (although qualitative differences existed between contexts). The Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisor (MCO)⁸ role deployed to Ukraine added considerable coordination value to the operational response.

Summarised learnings:

1. SMCC preparation and application is conditional on NS leadership understanding and buy-in.
2. NSs in both contexts found it challenging to accomplish their full convenor roles as expected.
3. The SMCC initiative (conceptual understanding) becomes more dilute the further it travels from Geneva.
4. The occupier of the co-convenor role might not necessarily be the 'strongest' actor in the partnership arrangement. This has implications for 'power and influence' dynamics.⁹
5. MCP's might be better suited to smaller scale emergencies with less Movement partners; and considered more a progress planning document than a definitive plan.
6. Mini-Summits and Joint Statements are valuable tools to framing the initial emergency response.
7. The MCO function has a greater coordination potential than is currently being utilised with a case made for mandatory/automatic deployment in any large-scale emergency.
8. An elective approach to the SMCC toolkit can diminish relevance and accountability.
9. There is opportunity to simplify the SMCC coordination mechanism.
10. Effectively supporting NS leadership transition is key to SMCC.

Priority 5 - *Promoting complementary domestic and international response*: the URCS's knowledge and application of SMCC tools ensured it was in a strong position to better coordinate its partners by insisting on a spirit of 'non-competition' and needing to work together, which permitted the NS a much clearer control of the resource mobilization and localization agenda. This was not the case for the PRCS. However, in both contexts different partner funding modalities negatively weighed on good resource mobilization practice. The way in which partner and HNSs tended to engage in separate programming/funding negotiations, while at times pragmatic, only served to inhibit effective coordination and reinforce division.

Summarised learnings:

1. The more the HNS leads the resource mobilization and localization agenda, the stronger its control of the outcomes.
2. Different partner funding modalities can conspire against good resource mobilization coordination practice (thus reinforcing the 'divide and rule' approach).

Priority 6 - *Enhancing the scalability of the response*: in both contexts opportunities were missed to secure response multiplier effects and leverage synergies due to a lack of

⁸ Previously called 'Movement Coordination Officer'.

⁹ Power being based on positional authority and influence being based on relationships.

consideration for other cooperation modalities than those used. While the media related controversies centring on the ICRC in Ukraine affected perceptions of overall SMCC effectiveness, this did not materially impact Movement scalability aspirations and opportunities.

Summarised learnings:

1. Multiplier effects could be secured by PNSs leveraging synergies through consortia and other cooperation modalities.
2. Priority 6 may provide inspiration for outcome indicator modelling for the SMCC initiative.
3. Ensuring effective response in future emergencies and crises will increasingly rely on being able to influence the narrative discourse (past, present, and future) surrounding the emergency/crisis.

The three **SMCC Ambitions** - 1: Change practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination; 2: Deliver well-coordinated and predictable operational responses; and 3: Reinforce the visibility of the collective response - were considered to be highly relevant to both contexts. However, achievements were mixed with Ukraine fairing considerably better than Pakistan due to the URCS's greater application of SMCC tools.

In terms of whether the SMCC initiative has been effective in achieving intended coordination objectives and efficient in facilitating the better use of Movement resources (funds, expertise, and time) at operational levels, the overall picture is complex and contrasting. In Ukraine, SMCC tool application to frame the emergency response, including during the preparation/laboratory stages had a positive impact on coordination behaviour, which translated to a **good effectiveness rating at operational level**. This is not the case for Pakistan.

In terms of efficiency in Ukraine, unfortunately, due to the unprecedented scale of the response and ensuing coordination challenges that centred on an inadequate understanding of the ideal coordination mechanism for Movement actors, the use of Movement resources cannot be said to have been efficient (*inter alia* coordination not being optimised under a single plan¹⁰). An efficiency judgement on Pakistan cannot be made as SMCC tool application to frame the response was extremely minimal.

Aside from the multiple SMCC process-type challenges related to e.g. effective data sharing, MIT functioning, coordinated appeal alignment, effective interoperability, tool application etc. raised in the synthesis/findings section that affected both contexts, the biggest factor preventing more efficacious Movement coordination in Ukraine was the fact that the operation started in the middle of the revision of the Seville Agreement process, being affected by both operational realities and 'political wrangling' at the senior leadership levels.¹¹ This negatively impacted the higher-level normative coordination aspirations as per Seville Agreement 2.0, had adverse implications for ensuring a well-coordinated operational response, and will likely continue to affect Movement response efforts unless resolved.¹²

10 Additional examples include initial IFRC Surge being less than efficient. Positively, overall coordination later improved with the advent of the URCS One Plan 2023-2025.

11 Indeed, the SMCC 2.0 Resolution noted that 'coordination remains a complex endeavour, and principal challenges include ensuring that the right mindset is cultivated across the Movement, that political leadership is appropriate and sustained, that the benefits of coordination are well understood . . .' (p.2).

12 The reviewer was alerted to similar 'wranglings' taking place in Libya following flooding in the wake of Storm Daniel and the collapse of two dams near the city of Derna. See: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/libya-people-hit-devastating-floods-need-your-help> and <https://www.ifrc.org/press-release/libya-floods-ifrc-announces-chf-10-million-appeal-urgent-relief-efforts>

Frustrating for many KIs was the fact that such politicking was happening at all, when given the frequency and magnitude of humanitarian emergencies and crises, Movement energy (funds, expertise, and time) should be focused on the IFRC and ICRC coming together rather than drifting apart.¹³

There will be many reasons why the above might be happening. Of overall central importance is the recognition that the IFRC and ICRC are not 'as one' when it comes to interpreting the Seville Agreement 2.0 or applying SMCC tools. Contributing factors include the ICRC being perceived by some interviewees to have a 'limited SMCC mindset' because of its priority focus on delivering on its conventional mandate.¹⁴ In contrast, the IFRC is better equipped to play a coordination role, but nonetheless was seen to have an overly transactional focus on Membership Coordination when interpreting the Seville Agreement 2.0. This said, there is strong evidence to indicate that SMCC continues to positively and constructively improve the way Movement partners work together through enhanced coordination and cooperation, especially in response to medium to large-scale emergencies as intended.

The review makes ten recommendations:

1. The ICRC and IFRC should collectively agree how the SMCC initiative will be mainstreamed in practice within each organisation to ensure functional complementarity.
2. The ICRC and IFRC should consider invoking a protocol for all large-scale emergencies that requires the ICRC Director of Operations and the IFRC Under Secretary General - National Society Development and Operations Coordination to convene and issue minimum SMCC parameters.
3. The ICRC and IFRC should consider reframing the SMCC initiative into a clearer concept and clarify how it fits into the Movement operational coordination system established by the Seville Agreement 2.0, to facilitate better understanding and promotion of Movement coordination roles, expectations, and tools across the Movement.
4. The ICRC and IFRC should consider conducting a status review of the MITs with a view to informing a more streamlined, agile and resource efficient structure and supporting Plan of Action.
5. The ICRC and IFRC should consider reviewing the SMCC toolkit with a view to determining if some tools should be mandatory during emergencies/crises.¹⁵
6. The ICRC and IFRC should ensure that that their managers in-country are performance managed to deliver on SMCC objectives or that a mandatory deployment of Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisors is made for all large-scale emergencies.
7. The Movement should step up SMCC and Seville Agreement 2.0 awareness raising and promotion (particularly for NS leadership/senior management levels).
8. The ICRC and IFRC should consider establishing a joint cadre of social media/media experts to proactively monitor media content in all emergency/crisis situations that involve a Movement response.

13 The main 'sticking points', as the reviewer understands, appear to be Seville Agreement 2.0 Articles 5.2; 5.4.1; and 6. It is beyond the remit of this review to explore this issue further. The review acknowledges these issues are recognised by IFRC/ICRC senior management with efforts underway to address them.

14 Acknowledging that the ICRC has to deliver both on its conventional operational mandate as well as on its coordination role, whereas the IFRC's mandate is NS coordination, including National Society Development, in support of Host NSs.

15 In addition to tools that are already mandatory as per the Seville Agreement 2.0 e.g. Movement Coordination Agreement (Article 4.2).

9. The IFRC should commission and enable a series of structured 'Partner Review Talks' that engage all Movement partners in Pakistan as a mechanism for how to improve coordination and cooperation in the country.
10. The ICRC and IFRC should consider commissioning a lessons learned exercise focusing on understanding 'partnership dimensions' during the emergency response (including build up) in the Ukraine context.

1. Background

The subject matter of this lessons learning review (LLR) is the Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) initiative. The purpose of the review was to highlight best practices and identify challenges of Movement coordination in large-scale emergencies and inform areas for improvement.

The SMCC initiative is the result of a joint assessment of challenges experienced in the field. SMCC aims to improve the way Movement partners work together and enhance coordination and cooperation, especially in response to medium to large-scale emergencies. The SMCC initiative is anchored in the Statutes of the Movement which affirm that all partners shall cooperate with each other according to their roles defined by their respective mandates. The roles and responsibilities, as well as the interaction between Movement partners are therefore defined by the Seville Agreement 2.0.¹⁶

Efforts to work together better as a Movement are not new. The process to strengthen coordination and cooperation within the Movement gained significant momentum in 2013, with the adoption of Resolution 4 at the Council of Delegates (CoD) in Sydney, Australia. This launched a comprehensive and inclusive Movement-wide consultation process in 2014–2015, with the participation of over 140 National Societies (NSs).

The results of the consultations and ensuing recommendations were presented to the 2015 CoD in a progress report¹⁷ which identified the necessity of enhanced Movement coordination in humanitarian crises and a strong willingness among Movement components to work together to fulfil the Movement's common goals. This positive momentum and spirit are reflected in Resolution 1¹⁸, which was adopted by consensus at the CoD in 2015 and tasked the Movement with implementing the SMCC Plan of Action for 2015–2017.¹⁹

By 2017, the initiative had gained significant momentum, improving the Movement's capacity for efficient large-scale emergency responses. Directly supported by over 40 NSs, implementation of SMCC has initiated a gradual change process and fostered a positive "SMCC spirit" among Movement components, positioning the Movement on the "front foot" in the evolving humanitarian ecosystem.²⁰

The Movement renewed its commitment to SMCC during the 2019 CoD, approving the SMCC 2.0 Resolution for the period 2019–2023.²¹ The 6 SMCC Priorities are:²²

1. Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management to enhance operational response, ensure accountability, and provide timely information on the Movement footprint to internal and external stakeholders, to increase our overall humanitarian funding as well as reinforce the relevance and visibility of Movement operations.

16 <https://smcctoolkit.org/background/>

17 https://rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2015/03/CoD15_SMCC_report-FINAL-EN.pdf

18 https://rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2015/03/CoD15-R1-SMCC_EN.pdf

19 IFRC. Progress Report Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation. CD/17/5. Q3 2017.

20 *ibid.*

21 The SMCC 2.0 continued to show the relevance of the work that started in 2013, moving forward in six priority areas in close collaboration with all Movement components. Source: Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC 2.0) Progress Report May 2022.

22 SMCC 2.0 focuses on seven priorities: two foundational elements, and five key enablers of Movement Coordination. These priorities are organised around the overarching ambition of achieving an efficient and effective humanitarian response. It was decided that the priority area of conferred responsibilities were to be handled outside the SMCC structure: i.e. Ensuring efficient and well-coordinated use of the conferred responsibilities of Movement components.

2. Pursuing the development of the interoperability of systems to ensure agile and flexible support to operations.
3. Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components to contribute to a response, including the domestic competencies of National Societies (NSs), to ensure services are provided efficiently and meet the required standard of quality.
4. Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing existing SMCC tools to promote common planning and analysis and coordinated activities, reflecting on whether other tools are required, developing an evidence base on what works well in coordination, and considering different operational models to suit different contexts.
5. Promoting complementary domestic and international response while ensuring the coherent and sustained development of local capacities, including in resource mobilization and in alignment with the localization agenda, emphasizing the need for operations that are as local as possible and as international as necessary.
6. Enhancing the scalability of the response in large-scale crises in a manner that reinforces the position of the Movement as a key global responder.

From the onset of SMCC in 2013, mainly anecdotal evidence has been gathered from the implementation of Movement coordination in operations and it has been difficult to measure the results of the initiative. Since the CoD 2019 Resolution, tangible deliverables on the various topics that the Movement Implementation Teams (MITs) have worked on remains limited. The investment capacity has been adversely affected by external factors such as the Covid-19 response and the Ukraine crisis. In certain cases, the issues that the MITs have been attempting to address are systemic issues which cannot be resolved at their level, or issues which are addressed in other fora.

Following a series of consultations with the SMCC Coordination Group and MIT co-chairs in the autumn of 2022, a meeting was held on 5 December 2022 to discuss the way forward with key SMCC stakeholders.²³ It was agreed to gain more substantive evidence of what is working and what is hampering Movement coordination through learning lessons from the two main Movement operational responses (Ukraine and Pakistan) which have either started after and/or continued after the adoption of the new normative framework, the Seville Agreement 2.0. This review is a contribution towards this end - the purpose, scope and objectives of which are set out below. The Terms of Reference (ToR) are contained at Annex A.

2. Purpose, scope, and objectives

The purpose of this review was to highlight best practices and identify challenges of Movement coordination in large-scale emergencies to document practices and inform areas for improvement. The aim was to generate evidence and learn how to best further strengthen Movement coordination in large-scale emergencies.

The scope of the review was to synthesize evidence from two large-scale emergency responses - Ukraine (a conflict response) and Pakistan (a disaster response) - to identify the challenges and opportunities for Movement partners - the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and NSs - to coordinate and harmonize their response to emergencies and better meet the needs of affected populations.²⁴ A background to each emergency/crisis may be found in the respective case studies (Annex B Ukraine; Annex C Pakistan) and for reasons of brevity will not be repeated in the synthesis section (4.1) of the report.

²³ SMCC 2.0 Suggested Optimisation Strategy.

²⁴ The LLR focuses on the implementation of the SMCC as a coordination mechanism between the IFRC, the ICRC, and NSs, and in the context of the response to Ukraine is limited to Ukraine and not the surrounding affected countries.

The review focused on the SMCC spirit of collaboration²⁵, as well as on the implementation of SMCC tools.²⁶ The objective was to ascertain whether Movement coordination has allowed improving the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement's collective impact and its positioning through maximized resources, increased complementarity, and reduced duplication and competition.

The specific review focus was to:

- Assess the extent to which the Movement components are fulfilling their commitment to strengthen coordination and cooperation in emergency operations and across the various areas of focus of the SMCC initiative.
- Identify whether the following SMCC ambitions are relevant and how much they have been fulfilled in both selected emergencies:
 - Ambition 1: Change practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination.
 - Ambition 2: Deliver well-coordinated and predictable operational responses.
 - Ambition 3: Reinforce the visibility of the collective response.
- Identify key enablers and challenges in the implementation of SMCC at the various levels (country, regional, headquarters).
- Assess the relevance of the guidance and tools that have been developed to support Movement coordination since the onset of the SMCC initiative, especially the Mini-Summit and the 3 levels of coordination mechanisms; and main tools and guidelines.
- Propose recommendations for further strengthening the implementation of the SMCC in current and future responses to crises.

The review was commissioned by Members of the Steering Committee of the SMCC, which ensured oversight of the review and validation and dissemination of the results. The review consultant reported to the SMCC Joint Evaluation Management Team consisting of:

- Head of Operational Membership and Movement Coordination, IFRC
- Head of MOV Division, ICRC,
- SMCC Coordination Group
- IFRC Coordinator, Evaluation
- ICRC Head of Evaluation Office

The primary audience for this review is the IFRC and the ICRC leadership and senior management, as well as the leadership of NSs involved in the response to both contexts mentioned. The secondary audience is all Movement components that have been or are likely to be involved in Movement-wide or multi-dimensional responses, and the Movement as a whole, as signatories to the SMCC initiative. The findings of the review will contribute to informing and framing the way forward for Movement coordination in future large-scale emergencies and providing inputs to a possible new SMCC Resolution. Findings will also be used to report on SMCC implementation of the current CoD period.

3. Review method

The review was conducted between June and November 2023 by an independent external consultant. The overarching review method was qualitative in nature guided by a Review Matrix (Annex D), combining a literature review (see Annex E) with virtual semi-structured interviews (see separate Inception Report for full methodology). The sub-questions included in the Review Matrix result from an unpacking of the review focus areas (Section 2 above) into more detailed inquiry lines. The review design was based on triangulation of evidence from

25 See Section 4 for explanation of SMCC spirit.

26 See: <https://smcctoolkit.org>

key informant interviews (KII) and the document review to assess consistency of evidence against both intent of SMCC and what was implemented.

A total of sixty-one (61) KIIs were conducted with a range of ICRC, IFRC, PNS, Host National Society (HNS) staff from HQ/regional/country/branch offices (ICRC 12 female, 15 male; IFRC 9 female, 13 male; PNS 2 female, 5 male; NS staff, 1 female, 4 male). Key informant (KI) sampling was purposive, selecting individuals with detailed involvement in, or knowledge of, the SMCC initiative and/or operational responses in the two contexts.²⁷ A balanced approach was used in sample selection i.e. aiming for equal numbers of KIs from the main organisations (IFRC and ICRC) including corresponding roles wherever possible e.g. Heads of Delegations/Country Offices. See Annex F for list of key informant roles.²⁸

Two interview question sets were developed: one for general KIs, and one for country/field based KIs (see Annex G). The interview sampling approach categorised KIs into general and/or country/field informants. Interview tools were piloted before use.

Country case studies were developed for both Ukraine and Pakistan using a descriptive case study format (Annexes B and C). This facilitated a comparative assessment of SMCC implementation in the two contexts to triangulate findings, help illustrate coordination strengths and limitations, and highlight what worked/did not work within each context and why.

The consultant transcribed all interviews. Data was organised following the question numbers contained in the Review Matrix. All content was digitally transferred to a master matrix and collectively ordered according to relevant inquiry lines. The master data set formed the analysis table on which the consultant based the report write-up. Evidence was triangulated from different sources (literature and stakeholder groups) to identify where evidence was consistent and where it was not as best as possible given time and resource constraints.

The review drew primarily on the Movement/SMCC criterion²⁹ of 'coordination' and whether coordination has contributed to 'effectiveness' and 'efficiency'.³⁰ However, the review was not tasked with performing an in-depth assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Movement response. The review also considered the criterion of 'relevance'³¹ in the context of the guidance and tools and their relevance to supporting Movement coordination.³²

The consultant had no conflicts of interest and was able to work independently and free from undue influence to produce findings and evaluative judgements. The review adhered to the IFRC's and ICRC's evaluation quality standards, and their respective quality assurance processes. The confidentiality of participating respondents was protected through anonymization. All primary data plus any sensitive and internal IFRC, ICRC, or NS documentation was subject to appropriate data protection and management practices.

27 KIs covered a full range of key staff across locations, including ICRC and IFRC Geneva and Regional/Country offices for the relevant countries, the NSs in those contexts, plus NSs working internationally in-country or involved as donors.

28 The evaluation did not entail consultations with target populations.

29 Where evaluation criteria are used in the framing of inquiry lines, the consultant will adhere to evaluation standards and specific, applicable processes outlined in good practice evaluation guidelines using the OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation and IFRC Evaluation Framework (2011) as reference points.

30 Effectiveness' is concerned with the extent to which the SMCC initiative has achieved its intended coordination objectives. 'Efficiency' is concerned with the SMCC facilitating better use of Movement resources (funds, expertise, and time) at operational levels.

31 'Relevance' is defined as the extent to which the intervention and design responded to the institutional needs, policies, and priorities, and continued to do so as circumstances changed.

32 In the context of this LLR, 'coordination' is concerned with the extent to which the interventions of different actors are harmonised with each other, promote synergy, avoid gaps, duplication, and resource conflicts. Source: ALNAP (2016) Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide. ALNAP Guide. London: ALNAP/ODI.

3.1. Review limitations

Establishing whether the lessons learned are credible and draw on a systematic review of the opinions of KIs was constrained by the select views of informants on various inquiry lines and the limited number of NS KIs. Moreover, in terms of identifying best practices and challenges to Movement coordination in large-scale emergencies to identify areas for improvement, an appreciation of context is important, and best practice in one context may not be best practice in another. In the same vein, some challenges identified in the two case studies may be specific to those countries and not likely in other countries/contexts. The reviewer used best judgement to determine what the lessons were.³³

The initial methodology envisaged a ‘realty check’ visit to Ukraine and Pakistan for the consultant to observe Movement coordination in practice e.g. attending partner meetings. However, this proved impractical due to no suitable events being scheduled over the review period. The inability to observe any coordination events was not felt to materially impact review findings due to the high number of KIs interviewed (20 more than the original estimate).

The countries selected for the review in terms of a Movement Coordination context were very different in type. Ukraine exhibited Movement Coordination in its fullest form, with a complex intertwining of the HNS, IFRC, ICRC and PNSs, whereas Pakistan was a context exhibiting primarily Membership Coordination (HNS, IFRC and PNSs), with very limited ICRC engagement other than in its exclusive geographical area of operation (given this, perhaps a better country case context could have been chosen). While the case studies were still able to highlight valuable learning, the context difference limited opportunity for cross-case comparison. The review timeline is shown below:

Products/deliverables	July	August	September	October	November
Draft Inception Report (IR) developed	10.7.23				
IR final submitted to IFRC/ICRC for Quality Assurance (QA)	27.7.23				
Data gathering and analysis	Start			End	
Draft 1 report submitted to SC				18.10.23	
IFRC/ICRC QA complete				23.10.23	
IFRC/ICRC comments on drafts 1-4 back to consultant				23.10.23 – 14.11.23	
Submission of final draft report					14.11.23
Submission of final report					12.23
Presentations to Movement partners					12.23

³³ The consultant took all reasonable steps to ensure that work was technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributed to organisational learning and accountability.

4. Synthesis - main findings and key learnings

This section presents the synthesis of main findings and key learnings arising from the review. To help guide the reader through this Section (and SMCC complexities), the six Priority areas are summarised as:

1. Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management
2. Pursuing the development of the interoperability of systems
3. Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components
4. Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing existing SMCC tools
5. Promoting complementary domestic and international response
6. Enhancing the scalability of the response

SMCC *spirit* is characterised as follows:

“We will work in complementarity, collaboration and non-competition, ensuring predictability and adopting a no-surprise behaviour. In our daily work, we will endeavour to co-create the ambition of our collective response and a coherent Movement voice, positioning ourselves as the Partner of choice in the wider humanitarian system. We will work with a solution-focused mindset, and exercise accountability by ensuring issues are raised and solved in a dialogue at the local level proactively, and elevate them to a higher platform only if local dialogue does not yield an acceptable solution. To reflect the fast-changing context, we will build personal relationships, invest in understanding our organisational differences and identify complementarities. We will be transparent, cognisant that our individual actions can have global consequences and we will regularly evaluate our performance regarding the implementation of this agreement.”³⁴

To facilitate sensemaking related to understanding *commitment* (review focus area 1 in 4.1 below), key learnings are categorised under each Priority area heading.³⁵ Priority 4 was selected for the review’s ‘deep dive’ (see Section 4.1.4). Analysis of the three SMCC Ambitions is contained in Section 4.2.

4.1. Coordination - fulfilling SMCC commitment

This aspect of the review looked at the extent to which the Movement components were fulfilling their commitment to strengthen coordination and cooperation in emergency operations and across the various SMCC initiative focus areas. SMCC commitment relates to the way in which partners can be seen to explicitly pursue SMCC Priority areas as well as adhere to the SMCC ‘spirit’.

In opening this section, it is useful to highlight that (a) due to the unprecedented scale of the response, coordination emerged as a challenge for the entire crisis response, and (b) there was an inadequate understanding of the ideal coordination mechanism during conflicts across Movement actors, particularly at the global IFRC Secretariat and ICRC Director General-level (plus regional level), where KIs reported relationship challenges between the two organisations.³⁶

For reader friendliness, highlight boxes are used to present key findings (first) and main learnings (last).

³⁴ Source: Movement Coordination Agreements. See further 4.1.4.2.

³⁵ To facilitate SMCC spirit sensemaking the sentiment was coded into the following attributes: complementarity; collaboration; non-competition; predictability; positioning; [being] solution focused; accountability; local proactivity; and transparency.

³⁶ Cf. IFRC Internal Operation Review Ukraine and Impacted Countries report March 2023. p.31.

4.1.1. Priority 1: Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management to enhance operational response³⁷

Priority 1 findings

1. There was limited effective data sharing between partners on aspects of the operational response.
2. Coordinating appeals proved a challenging process.
3. PNSs felt pressure from back-donors/home national governments to have visibility in high profile/action areas of Ukraine. This was predictable.
4. There were no SMCC joint outcome/impact indicators to guide the operational responses at the strategic level that would indicate the intended positive outcomes for affected populations.
5. The Ukraine Red Cross Society (URCS) was overall feted for pursuing a 'SMCC spirit' of 'non-competition' and reminding partners of the need to work together.

Effective Movement data management requires effective data sharing, the lack of which has negative implications for enhancing operational response and reinforcing relevance and visibility of Movement operations.³⁸ The need and opportunity for more effective data management/sharing was recognised early in the Ukraine response (by April 2022). Efforts were made to align data collection and to utilize a common data approach through the GO Platform (see below) as a means to better articulate the Red Pillar response, enable collective impact, and contribute to strategizing the scale-up of Movement components.

The IFRC's commitment to Movement-wide *consistent data management* is exemplified through its GO Platform, the organisation's emergency operations platform for capturing, analysing, and sharing real-time data during a crisis.³⁹ Analysis of the Ukraine⁴⁰ emergency (and impacted countries) GO portal shows data related to *inter alia* surge and situation analysis (cash and logistics being under development). An indicator tracking tool is used to define standard indicators across the IFRC, enabling collective achievements and results to be measured and communicated widely.⁴¹ For the Pakistan emergency, the Platform acts more as a document library (and less real-time data window) when compared to Ukraine.⁴²

The ICRC's commitment to open data sharing with partners is self-restricted (security and confidentiality issues cited as legitimate reasons for strict data control). In Ukraine, the ICRC's minimal approach to data sharing was felt to impede the ability to establish an accurate *Movement footprint*, which in turn negatively affected collective efforts for enhancing the operational response (ICRC admitted to challenges in establishing its common response indicators). In Pakistan, the ICRC's approach to data sharing was considered positive, although strictly on a 'need to know' basis.

37 Full: Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management to enhance operational response, ensure accountability, and provide timely information on the Movement footprint to internal and external stakeholders, to increase our overall humanitarian funding as well as reinforce the relevance and visibility of Movement operations.

38 Visibility in SMCC is primarily illustrated through the Movement picture, the purpose of which is to clearly demonstrate the collective reach and who is doing what during an operation across various Movement actors, recognising the priorities of the NS and the role of each Movement player in achieving the collective Movement mission.

39 <https://www.ifrc.org/happening-now/emergencies/ifrc-go> Its aim is to help the IFRC's network better meet the needs of affected communities.

40 <https://go.ifrc.org/emergencies/5854>

41 It was not possible to verify if this took place, but the intention is that the data in the form is shared on the GO platform with public visibility, with consolidated data on indicators providing a Federation-wide overview of the Red Cross and Red Crescent activities globally.

42 Reasons for the difference are unknown but Pakistan omits the indicator tracking tool inputs associated with Ukraine.

Partner National Society (PNS) commitments to data sharing in both contexts were overall well intentioned, although some PNSs were rated ‘more open’ to sharing than others. In Ukraine, challenges attributed to ensuring PNSs contribution to Movement footprint clarity included: (a) unilateral PNS announcements of significant funding increase with limited consideration for impact on wider Movement coordination efforts⁴³; (b) exponential PNS funding increases from initial modest levels, increasing pressure to use budgets quickly; (c) PNS geographical work overlapping with ICRC intervention areas⁴⁴ and the subsequent security coordination challenges this caused. In Pakistan, data sharing was mostly informal and unstructured, making contribution to Movement footprint clarity difficult (cf. 4.4.4.10).

In terms of NS commitment to Priority 1, the URCS was felt to have made a best effort to share data with partners. The NS maintained an information dashboard, but accuracy levels were questionable with aspects duplicating GO Platform data. This was considerably improved in the second year of the operation once the data collection system was established (supported by the IFRC and now owned by the URCS). However, a challenge remains in the willingness of PNSs to share their data in full - transparently and consistently. The Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) shared little operational response data with its partners.

Partner commitments to increase *overall humanitarian funding* in the Ukraine context were essential given the magnitude of the emergency. However, in the case of some PNSs this had consequences for effective cooperation and coordination - negatively impacting SMCC spirits of ‘complementarity’, ‘non-competition’ and ‘positioning’. Pressure on PNSs from their own national governments and/or back donors for visibility in Ukraine (pejoratively referred to as ‘flag planting’) resulted in pressure on the PNSs themselves to rapidly disburse funds, forgoing some SMCC *principles* in the process,⁴⁵ and placing increasing demands on the ICRC to facilitate safer access to territory.

The URCS was overall feted for pursuing a SMCC spirit of ‘non-competition’ and reminding partners of the need to work together. Pragmatism at the onset of the emergency was to ensure ‘things got done and done quickly’ and was the right ‘thing to do’. However, complementarity in later response stages could have been better secured had the attitude that ‘the PNS with the most funding and moves fastest gets the work’ been avoided, which invariably involved URCS separately negotiating with PNSs. This ‘competitiveness’ challenge to complementarity was considered an entirely predictable factor not least due to the positioning of donor nations on the Ukraine situation.

The ICRC’s limited data sharing was also seen to negatively weigh on wider collective efforts to increase the Movement’s *overall humanitarian funding* in Ukraine. Given the ICRC’s known funding predicament⁴⁶, some KIs questioned the lack of proactive amelioration in scoping thematic/geographical areas where partners might offer resource support. The drive for

43 It was suggested that announcements such as these are best channelled through the convenor.

44 At the centre of the ICRC’s purpose is people suffering as a result of armed conflict and violence. It is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. To deliver on its mission, the ICRC engages in confidential dialogue with the State and non-State authorities on respect for international humanitarian law and other fundamental rules protecting persons in situations of violence. The ICRC endeavours to operate hand in hand with NSs and is committed to delivering on Movement coordination commitments under Seville Agreement 2.0, as cooperation and coordination are critical to enhancing humanitarian impact. The ICRC is also responsible for maintaining and disseminating the Fundamental Principles, and contributes to a strong and principled humanitarian action of the Movement.

45 For some KIs this situation was reminiscent of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and Tsunami Movement response, in which competition was an unedifying feature of the early response stage. The disaster prompted an unprecedented outpouring of generosity from the public.

46 <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/update-icrc-financial-situation>

increased funding was also felt to have created an unhealthy level of competition between IFRC and ICRC, ‘contributing to the politization of aid and causing them to become direct competitors for both space and funding’. Another inhibitor to securing an accurate *Movement footprint* related to the different IFRC and ICRC timelines when budgeting for emergency response, which made it difficult to coordinate appeals⁴⁷ (see further Section 4.1.4.11).

In terms of leveraging data management as a means of ensuring *accountability*, a lack of outcome level indicators⁴⁸ was felt to have inhibited a more effective operational response. While process type indicators to ensure ‘tools are in use’⁴⁹ during an emergency have their place (see also Priority 4 below), there is also a need for joint performance/success level indicators to help partners strategically frame the response i.e. focusing on the intended outcomes for affected populations.⁵⁰ This finding has wider ramifications for the strategisation of SMCC and aspirations for enhancing coordination and cooperation in response to emergencies.

Key learnings related to Priority 1:

1. A lack of open data sharing between partners negatively weighs on efforts to establish accurate Movement footprints and improve operational response.
2. Different IFRC and ICRC budgeting processes make coordinating appeals challenging.
3. The high amounts of funding pouring into Ukraine and the pressure on PNSs to have visibility in high profile areas was predictable.
4. SMCC potential is being limited by a lack of joint outcome/impact indicators.
5. A Host NS with good SMCC understanding is in a stronger position to coordinate its partners.

4.1.2. Priority 2: Pursuing the development of the interoperability of systems to ensure agile and flexible support to operations

Priority 2 findings

1. The SMCC Plan of Action (PoA) represents a strong tangible, collective effort to address key systemic interoperability challenges.
2. Good interoperability practice was exhibited by Logistics and Supply Chain and ensured agile and flexible support to operations.
3. Delays in finalising the resource mobilisation table negatively impacted key interoperability aspirations.

At the heart of this Priority is the concept of interoperability. This requires an openness to consider and incorporate other partners’ practices into one’s own procedures where those practices are more efficient and/or effective. Other Movement studies⁵¹ adopting an interoperability lens have highlighted the essentiality of this feature to effective coordination

47 This impacts ability to communicate to internal and external stakeholders in order to increase overall humanitarian funding.

48 i.e. indicators that would determine the success of the emergency response (as well as the resources to monitor, collect and analyse the information).

49 Akin to a checklist.

50 This was eventually achieved through the URCS ONE Plan. The plan became a tool for alignment i.e. better use of resources by Movement partners, joint planning and joint initiatives, for example, consortiums around thematic issues and technical working groups.

51 For example: ICRC, Norwegian Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross Review of the Rapid Deployment Mechanism Emergency Medical Team Aden. 30 July 2021.

and cooperation.⁵² While not exhaustive, the main enablers/challenges to Priority 2 were: the SMCC PoA, Logistics and supply chain, Surge, and Security.

4.1.2.1. SMCC Plan of Action - a good example of illustrating partners' macro-commitment to Priority 2 and specifically pursuing the development of systems interoperability in practice is seen via the SMCC PoA 2023-2024. The PoA details various objectives and activities orientated to addressing numerous challenges identified during this review as well as other SMCC studies across multiple priorities and themes. It incorporates the work of multiple Movement Implementation Teams (MITs) (with diverse Movement membership) and thus represents a tangible, collective effort to address key systemic interoperability challenges, key examples of which are provided in subsequent sections below and in 4.3.1.

4.1.2.2. Logistics and supply chain – to help illustrate partner commitment/contributions to Priority 2, Logistics and supply chain represents a positive example of well secured Movement interoperability, undertaken in a spirit of *non-competition* and positively contributing to being '*solution focused*' in both emergency contexts.⁵³ Analysis of the SMCC PoA⁵⁴ identifies various objectives and activities for improving Logs interoperability. These include: lessons learned exercises after deployments to ensure that both organisations address outstanding *interoperability* and coordination issues; development of an *interoperability* framework to facilitate operational coordination; improving stock *interoperability* through optimised strategic pre-positioning across the Movement; and strengthening fleet management coordination and *interoperability* to support operations.

In terms of country examples for showcasing Movement interoperability⁵⁵, in Pakistan at the request of IFRC and the Norwegian Red Cross, ICRC Logs facilitated medicine procurement/importation for PRCS Mobile Health Units (good interoperability cooperation levels were also reported for Emergency Response Unit (ERU) coordination in Pakistan). In Ukraine, ICRC/IFRC Supply Chain and Logistics produced guidance for channelling in-kind and financial contributions to the Movement response.⁵⁶ Working relations between IFRC and ICRC Logistics in Budapest⁵⁷, including ICRC's arrangements with the Danish Red Cross' hub in Romania were also cited as examples of good interoperability, contributing positively to effective cooperation and coordination and enabling goods to reach Ukraine in a timely way.⁵⁸

4.1.2.4. Surge – Surge has the SMCC PoA interoperability objective to ensure its systems across the Movement are better connected.⁵⁹ Good 'on track' progress is reported for most Surge PoA tasks and only three KIs raised surge as a concern. One issue related to the rationale applied for some ERU deployments, questioning if need had been established before

52 The ICRC in particular recognises that as it has grown and diversified in response to increasingly challenging operating environments. The organisation has responded by adding new layers and processes etc. recognising agility is key to responding effectively and efficiently. Supporting NSs are developing their existing agile rapid deployment capacities to better meet Movement requirements for operating in challenging environments. The IFRC are developing various platforms, with ICRC contributing to these IFRC/NS-led platforms on optimisation and development of the Movement's surge capacity. See also SMCC 2.0 Progress Report May 2022.

53 The Logs MIT had the key objective to ensure that logistics systems within the Movement are fully interoperable.

54 Logistics is recorded as 'tracking well' in the PoA.

55 Admittedly in light of the NSs not always being able to fulfil their roles (often due to capacity issues) and recognising the reputational and legal risks these situations can pose for NSs.

56 Original 6 March 2022. Revised 11 May 2022.

57 However, it was felt that 'political' decisions related to geographical division in Ukraine made it challenging for the IFRC/ICRC Budapest teams to work cohesively.

58 The review also acknowledges the joint IFRC/ICRC Logistics Hubs in Debrecen, Hungary and Lublin, Poland, along with the Movement Coordination Log Cell in Ukraine that supported Movement partners in sending goods to URCS.

59 With a specific activity to ensure interoperability of systems and processes through lessons learned exercises after deployments. Surge is recorded as 'moving forward with delays' in the PoA.

deployment and the implications of a finite HR pool when other global emergencies are in play. The other issue concerned the time it took to finalise the resource mobilisation table (described as a key interoperability failing) due to IFRC and ICRC not having a common understanding on matters, each having their own, different platforms, and an inability to reach agreement on mobilisation planning timeframes (which were different for each organisation).

However, it should be recorded that for IFRC operations, the surge system was considered the primary challenge in Ukraine for multiple reasons that included: high personnel turnover; lack of surge delegate understanding of role and uncertain role expectations; lack of engagement and accountability; limited HNS interest to engage with delegates; challenges of 'managing' delegates not properly selected according to operational and HNS needs; insufficient operational and NSD experience; absence of deployment approval from the HNS. All of these were reported to have greatly compromised coordination and contributed to mistrust between Movement partners.

4.1.2.5. Security – key to interoperability in an emergency context is effective security management and multiple Ukraine KIs commented how security challenges/arrangements negatively impacted Priority 2 aspiration in the early response stages.⁶⁰ Due to the overwhelming magnitude of the crisis security management arrangements did not evolve as desired.⁶¹ This is complex matter beyond the scope of this review but is referenced here for the record. No significant security issues related to SMCC were raised in the Pakistan context, with any incidents cited taking place in a Membership context.⁶²

In summary, there was a good commitment to Priority 2. Having specific PoA interoperability objectives for Logs and Surge illustrates good planning for results. It is positive to see that Surge in particular will be conducting lessons learned exercises after deployments to ensure that both organisations address interoperability and coordination, and this practice could be extended to all relevant MITs (see further 3.3.1 for extended analysis on MITs).

Key learnings related to Priority 2:

1. Logs interoperability objectives and activities provide a useful template for other MIT interoperability aspirations, contributing to a more strategized Priority 2.
2. Improving resource mobilisation table processes and early cross-institution alignment is key to interoperability and securing a more effective/efficient response.

4.1.3. Priority 3: Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components to contribute to a response⁶³

Establishing various partner commitments to this Priority was challenging. While not an exhaustive list, the main challenges (there were few enablers) related to MITs, coordination positioning, and the Movement Contingency Plan (MCP).⁶⁴

60 In Ukraine, a Security Framework Agreement was in place since 2016 as part of the SMCC Lab process.

61 Source: IFRC IOR Ukraine and Impacted Countries report (March 2023).

62 The SMCC PoA 2018-2019 had the Objective 2.2.1 - Clarify security management agreements and field arrangements to the greatest extent possible as per current efforts in several operational contexts. Output: Joint IFRC/ICRC Paper on Movement security arrangements. Security is recorded as 'not progressing' in the PoA.

63 Full: Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components to contribute to a response, including the domestic competencies of NSSs, to ensure services are provided efficiently and meet the required standard of quality

64 It was beyond the review scope to determine the extent to which Movement components actually contributed to the two emergencies, as this would have required a substantive investigation of the responses themselves.

Priority 3 findings

1. MIT work related to understanding/unpacking the use of competencies within the Movement has no traction.
2. There was no clear, collective Movement coordination position on SMCC to guide emergency operations.
3. MCPs were not developed to any meaningful extent prior to the emergencies and thus had limited utility at emergency/crisis onset.
4. There was/is limited overall understanding of Movement component capacity to effectively respond to the emergencies.

4.1.3.1. MITs – while a commitment to understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components to contribute to a response is implicit across all the MITs, SMCC PoA Objective 1⁶⁵ attempts to concretise this through activities related to *inter alia* ‘unpacking the use of competencies within the Movement’. The objective of having a clear lens on the actual capacity of Movement components (ICRC, IFRC, PNS/NS) at any given time, but particularly prior to a crisis to provide a measure of preparedness and response capability is essential (see also 4.1.3.3 below). Unfortunately, indications are that none of the assigned MIT Competencies activities have started, and the lack of PoA identified deliverables will certainly make it challenging for the assigned team(s) to move forward in a structured way.⁶⁶ The role of MITs is considered further in Section 4.3.

4.1.3.2. Coordination positioning – a further challenge for the ICRC and IFRC when attempting to align understanding and utilisation of Movement component capacity relates to how each organisation positions (or is perceived to position) its role in the response. As one senior KI noted, ‘the ICRC privileges its operations above any Movement requirements, placing less emphasis on coordination and cooperation, whereas the IFRC tends to privilege processes - particularly those related to Membership coordination’ (see further 4.1.4.2 and 4.1.4.4).

These different priorities, real or otherwise, contribute to an analysis disconnect, making it difficult to reach a common alignment understanding on *inter alia* how to effectively utilise Movement capacity, and how that capacity picture is communicated to wider partners.⁶⁷ This also limits ability to form a collective view around what the partners jointly want to achieve for affected populations, and how the *domestic competencies of NSs* as the essential local actors can be best supported to do this over the long-term and not just during the crisis.⁶⁸

4.1.3.3. Movement Contingency Plan – (The tool aspect of MCPs is addressed in 4.1.4.6.) MCPs are central to understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components to better contribute to a response, but neither Pakistan nor Ukraine had/have these in place. In Ukraine, accepting that the Movement was largely unprepared for the magnitude of the event, an NS contingency plan of sorts was in place (see further 4.1.4.6.). In Pakistan, an altogether more predictable emergency context⁶⁹, there was limited contingency planning. This said, associated planning processes were seen as valuable contributors to preparedness

65 For the Awareness and Promotion team under Ambition 1: ‘Change practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination’.

66 Given this, the reviewer finds it curious that Competencies activity status is marked as ‘moving forwards but with delays’.

67 Acknowledging that there was an effort (some six months after conflict escalation) to acknowledge what each Movement component and the IFRC membership had to offer in terms of expertise i.e. Shared Leadership. Several technical working groups were co-chaired by IFRC, ICRC or a PNS.

68 For the ICRC, part of the issue relates to the extent of SMCC awareness raising it engages in for HQ operational colleagues prior to deployment (reportedly minimal, which proves problematic when delegates arrive in country); and for the IFRC and for the NS, a lack of SMCC technical capacity was considered to prevent it from fully assuming its convenor role.

69 Characterised as some in-country KIs as slow onset.

arrangements (although qualitative differences existed between contexts). This is not to be critical, but rather to highlight the challenge/realism of developing 'proper' MCPs in the first place.⁷⁰

Key learnings related to Priority 3:

1. The initial lack of IFRC/ICRC 'coordination positioning' clarity affected the partners ability to provide a more coherent response.
2. MCPs are not thorough – this limits real time understanding of how capacities of Movement components can be utilised to contribute to a response.
3. Few KIs expected MCPs to have utility.

4.1.4. Priority 4 (deep dive): *Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing SMCC tools.*⁷¹ This priority was selected for the 'deep dive'⁷² and thus incorporates the third focus of the review: relevance of SMCC tools and guidance.⁷³

Key to ensuring Priority 4 relates to not only ensuring that there is awareness of the SMCC tools, but that tools are activated during an emergency in a timely way.⁷⁴ When considering the relevance of the guidance and tools developed to support Movement coordination since the onset of the SMCC initiative, as well as those used in the two emergency contexts, it is important to clarify that in Pakistan none of the SMCC tools other than the MCA and Joint Statement⁷⁵ were activated, thus helping explain only limited Pakistan analysis.⁷⁶

Priority 4 findings

1. In Pakistan, effective SMCC preparation and application was negatively affected by low NS senior management and leadership understanding and buy-in for the initiative.
2. The extent and fullness to which NSs played their convenor roles differed considerably between the two contexts.
3. SMCC initiative understanding was strongest at Geneva levels and weakest at branch levels.
4. MCP's had limited utility.
5. Mini-Summits and MCOs, where used/deployed, added considerable value to the operational response.
6. The Coordinated Appeals approach was rendered challenging due to different

70 Knowledgeable KIs cited Armenia as the only country in which a MCP was fully developed under SMCC oversight. One PNS produced the MCP that facilitated the quick and efficient Movement response in relation to the Nagorno Karabakh operation. Source: SMCC 2.0 Pillar II Baseline Survey. October 2021.

71 Full: Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing existing SMCC tools to promote common planning and analysis and coordinated activities, reflecting on whether other tools are required, developing an evidence base on what works well in coordination and considering different operational models to suit different contexts.

72 As per Review ToR suggestion should data and interest levels permit for a single priority area.

73 Review question 3.1. How relevant have the guidance and tools that have been developed to support Movement coordination since the onset of the SMCC initiative, especially the Mini-Summit and the 3 levels of coordination mechanisms?

74 There is some debate as to whether tool activation should be ideally sequential or whether there is opportunity for a looped process in which tools can be revisited at a later time or re-sequenced according to contextual needs.

75 This was only produced some four months after the emergency began.

76 While multiple justifications were given for not activating the tools (see separate case study), this caused some frustration among the PNSs and ICRC, and it was felt had they been used, tensions between partners would have been reduced, and a speedier solution to some key response issues secured (not least by means of a Mini-Summit and supporting decision table). This, however, would have necessitated the full engagement of the NS at strategic platform level, which was not forthcoming and provides insight into reasons for non-tool activation without needing to refer to the case study (Annex C).

institutional budgeting processes.

7. Operational response efficiency and effectiveness was greatly enhanced where SMCC tools were used (and contributed to increased accountability levels).

The following table summarises the main tools that make up the SMCC 'kit'⁷⁷ and provides a snapshot of how each was used in the two country contexts.

⁷⁷ For a full description of the SMCC toolkit see [here](#).

Table 1: SMCC tool summary and snapshot of how each was used in Pakistan and Ukraine

Stage	Tool	Description	Tool use in context
Preparedness and NSD	Movement Operational Checklist	Guides Movement field practitioners in operations in applying SMCC at all stages of a Movement response	While not a specific focus of the review due to the checklist nature, it may be said that by virtue of <u>Ukraine</u> being an SMCC Lab, most (not all) preparedness measures were formally put into place - also evidenced by the immediate emergency phase actions taken. In <u>Pakistan</u> , preparedness measures appear more informal in nature and not comprehensive.
	Movement Coordination Agreement (MCA)	Framework in which Movement components coordinate their operations and programmes at all times	MCA for <u>Pakistan</u> developed June 2022. MCA for <u>Ukraine</u> developed February 2021.
	Movement Security Agreements (MSA)	Outlines the current security situation and defines the security strategy for a coordinated Movement response	Beyond scope of review.
	Movement Contingency Plan (MCP)	Operational strategy for Movement actors to support the implementation of the NS Contingency Plan.	<u>Ukraine</u> - No MCP - efforts orientated to supporting the NS's contingency plan. <u>Pakistan</u> - No MCP.
Emergency / immediate steps	Mini-summit and Mini-summit decision table	Immediate summit in aftermath of an emergency triggering a collective Movement response as per the Seville Agreement 2.0 (within 48 hours of an emergency)	<u>Ukraine</u> – Two mini-summits held (1 st 24.2.22, 2 nd in two parts 1.4.22 & 4.4.22) first within 48 hours of the emergency. <u>Pakistan</u> – No mini-summit held.
	Joint Statement	Communicate to the entire Movement the operational situation, confirm each Movement partners role and responsibilities and define the “Ask” regarding additional resources.	<u>Ukraine</u> – Two versions: 1 st 24 February 2022 superseded by 29 July 2022 version (4 months after emergency). Complex in nature with interpretation required for various convenor/co-convenor articles. <u>Pakistan</u> – Produced 21 October 2022 (4 months after flood). Succinct with clear convenor/co-convenor roles.
	Movement Coordination	Surge role. Advises on coordination and set up of coordination structure	<u>Ukraine</u> – MCO deployed to Ukraine in 2022. <u>Pakistan</u> – MCO not considered necessary due to limited ICRC flood engagement.

Stage	Tool	Description	Tool use in context
	Operations' Advisors		
Movement Response	Movement Picture	A visual map of the presence and operations of the Movement in a specific country context and/or region	<u>Ukraine</u> – Three Movement pictures produced (2.2022-10.2022, 6.2022, 10.2023). Movement overview document 2022 'One year of the Russia-Ukraine international armed conflict'. <u>Pakistan</u> – No Movement picture.
Communicate and Mobilise	Joint Communications Products	Guidelines to ensure continuity in how Movement communicates/presents itself internally and externally	<u>Ukraine</u> - Movement Communication Guidelines produced for the Ukraine crisis for the purposes of supporting Movement communication efforts on the situation in Ukraine and neighbouring countries. 11 March 2022. <u>Pakistan</u> – No guidelines produced.
	Coordinated Appeals	Appeals are coordinated between Movement components to present planned activities and funding needs in a coherent manner ⁷⁸	<u>Ukraine</u> – Draft coordinated appeal document only (undated). <u>Pakistan</u> – No coordinated appeal (ICRC provided inputs to IFRC Federation-wide Operations Plan).
Accountability and PMER	Joint Real-Time Evaluation and Lessons Learned	Real time updates to IFRC and ICRC Senior Management on use of the various SMCC tools in the initial stages of an emergency response	<u>Ukraine</u> – Examples include: Mission Report MCO (16.3.2022 – 20.5.2022); and the substantive IFRC Internal Operation Review Ukraine and Impacted Countries report (March 2023). <u>Pakistan</u> – No known publications to date.

⁷⁸ Two separate but pre-agreed and complementary appeals – one ICRC and one IFRC – presented jointly to donors with a shared and agreed joint introductory and framing narrative.

The following part of this section considers the relevance of each SMCC tool in turn. Sub-heading colour indicates the stage shown in the table above for easy reference (non-sequential).

4.1.4.1. Movement Operational Checklist

The Movement Operational Checklist was developed in 2023 after the start of both emergencies. Its aim is to help and guide Movement field practitioners in operations in applying SMCC at all stages of a Movement response and is highly relevant. In the absence of the checklist, the fact that Ukraine was an SMCC Lab contributed to rapid tool activation with clear *strategic platform* (see further 4.1.4.5) engagement and NS lead from the outset.⁷⁹ In Pakistan, a beta-type checklist had been used as a preparation approach pre-crisis, however, primarily due to the NS leadership change at the height of the emergency⁸⁰, much preparation work undertaken fell by the wayside.

4.1.4.2. Movement Coordination Agreement

The MCA provides the framework in which Movement components operating in the respective country coordinate their operations and programmes at all times. This ensures Movement preparedness by defining the specific roles and responsibilities of the Movement partners. Its *relevance* lies in the aim to strengthen and maximize the partners' complementarity capabilities and to help ensure movement preparedness therefore avoiding duplication or inefficiencies resulting from miscommunication and misinterpretation.⁸¹ In both emergency contexts, the MCA was appreciated for its enabling role prior to an emergency, permitting structured dialogue on the strengths, limitations and opportunities emerging through the development process, and providing a lens on how the partnership needed to evolve to meet the contained aspirations.

While the MCA is clearly intended to be a positive frame for Movement coordination and is thus highly relevant as a tool, the way in which the various coordinating roles (co-convenor in particular – see 4.1.4.4) were interpreted diminished relevance-in-practice.⁸² For many KIs engaged in the Ukraine emergency, the MCA was overly subject to how 'personalities' chose to interpret roles for what was characterised as institutional gain at the expense of Movement cooperation and coordination.⁸³ It was also clear that 'interpretation' issues stray into differences between Movement coordination and Membership coordination⁸⁴, thus muddying further already unclear waters (see also 4.1.3.2).⁸⁵

In Pakistan, the MCA was also signed before the Seville Agreement 2.0 came into effect (thus co-convenor/convenor roles not being found in the MCA). Furthermore, the flood emergency took place a few months after the Seville Agreement 2.0 was adopted, meaning that roles and responsibilities were largely unclear too many, if not all, Movement components.

79 There have since been fewer strategic platform meetings and engagement levels on the part of the NS have reportedly reduced.

80 The point of convenor responsibility is addressed in point 4.1.4.3 below.

81 <https://smcctoolkit.org/tool-kit/>

82 SMCC MCA template 2023. Much of the cause for this concern centres on the Part II aspect of the Seville Agreement 2.0, in which the Movement coordination mechanisms established under the MCA will be scaled up and specific coordination roles (convenor/co-convenor) will be assigned.

83 The convenor/co-convenor roles were not included in the Ukraine MCA since the MCA was adopted in 2021.

84 Membership coordination is a core statutory obligation of the IFRC. 'During large-scale and protracted crises, or in fragile contexts, the IFRC may coordinate the strategic and operational response between National Societies. This helps increase our network's efficiency so we can best support affected communities. IFRC headquarters takes overall strategic direction for all our emergency operations worldwide. It ensures global coherence, compliance with our global policies and standards, and can provide global support to National Societies in the form of people, money or expertise. IFRC Regional Offices (RO) take the lead in setting and maintaining the overall strategic direction of the operation. They also request and coordinate international support as efficiently and effectively as possible for all operations in their region'. Source: <https://www.ifrc.org/who-we-are/international-red-cross-and-red-crescent-movement/> <1/9/23>.

85 This helps understand the tension over roles and responsibilities between ICRC and IFRC, as the crisis/contexts referenced in this statement can overlap with armed conflict and internal strife. A Joint Statement on Complementarity shared by IFRC Secretary General and ICRC Director General on 4 October 2023 clarified that in situations triggering a large-scale Movement response, Movement coordination comes first, with Membership coordination serving to align IFRC members.

4.1.4.3. Convenor role

In terms of convener/co-convener specifics, appointment guidelines are clear: as soon as possible after the onset of an emergency immediate clarity around convener and co-convener roles is required, thus providing the IFRC and ICRC with an indication of clear mandate regarding who plays the co-convener role with the HNS.⁸⁶

In Ukraine, while many KIs were complimentary about the NS's overall response performance, not all felt it was playing its 'full' convenor role as per the Joint Statement. This was attributed to stretched/limited senior NS senior management capacity that impacted ability to convene and attend strategic platform meetings. This said, URCS senior management was fettered for continuing to show SMCC leadership even as the conflict unfolded.

In Pakistan, the NS did not play its convenor role (but noting that the emergency in Pakistan took place just after the approval of the Seville Agreement 2.0). While noting that the and the change of PRCS leadership took place in the midst of the operation, PRCS leadership/senior management made little attempt to implement SMCC tools nor convene/attend any strategic platform meetings. This was attributed in part to (a) the PRCS not fully understanding what its role was, a situation exacerbated by the incoming PRCS Chairman's newness to the NS and the RCRC Movement as well as a change of Secretary General; and (b) a lack of SMCC dissemination (including to wider NSs in the Asia-Pacific region).⁸⁷

In both Ukraine and Pakistan, NSs were characterised as preferring to engage bilaterally with PNSs (referred to as 'divide and rule') as a means of leveraging resources and avoiding dealing with often disparate agendas⁸⁸ (cf. 4.1.1) and is the only example in which the SMCC spirit of 'transparency' was felt challenged.⁸⁹ Unfortunately, such practices lead to coordination inefficiencies as evidenced by PNSs duplicating support/deployments to both contexts.

4.1.4.4. Co-convener role

The Ukraine Joint Statements⁹⁰ set out the co-convener role, but this was an involved arrangement with a need to interpret various Seville Agreement 2.0 articles in a second version (July 2022) due to the complex nature of the conflict. ICRC was deemed co-convener, with IFRC taking that title in the surrounding countries. This created complicated Movement coordination processes/structures between different countries' responses which many KIs found confusing. However, the Seville Agreement 2.0 and the July Joint Statement outlined security approaches between URCS, IFRC and ICRC and clarified how IFRC could provide Integration Agreements to PNS, under ICRC security.⁹¹ The ICRC's co-convener role was felt challenged due to having to respond to the humanitarian consequence of the first major International Armed Conflict in decades and the scale and magnitude of the humanitarian impact.⁹²

In the Pakistan Joint Statement, the co-convener role was clear from the outset, however, some partners looked to the IFRC to enact a more systematic roll-out of SMCC tools (in the absence of NS action) and through this bring a level of accountability to both convenor and co-convener roles,

86 If each group is adhering to their mandate separately, there would be an overlap in responding to a multi-country conflict - IFRC focusing on the HNS response, and ICRC focusing on civilians affected by conflict and armed forces.

87 KIs reported for example that during NS regional meetings, NS knowledge of the Seville Agreement 2.0 and SMCC 2.0 was overall low. The APRO was reported to have two individuals charged with promoting SMCC but that little progress had been achieved to date.

88 It was reported that the Movement in Ukraine is perceived as being heavy, labour intensive, not always solution orientated, nor providing the required technical support/expertise, which can make the Movement less attractive than other international partners.

89 Being distinct from less transparent operational practices as say via the reported rerouting of aid in Pakistan.

90 There were two Joint Statements: one before the adoption of the Seville Agreement 2.0 (February 2022) and at the end of July, taking into account Seville Agreement 2.0. This is important to highlight as the roles and responsibilities of each partner during the emergency phase between the two dates was based on the first Joint Statement.

91 Source: IFRC IOR Ukraine and Impacted Countries report (March 2023).

92 Source: ICRC Where do we stand? February 2023.


but again accepting that the emergency took place just after the approval of the Seville Agreement 2.0 (see 4.1.4.3 – Pakistan).

4.1.4.5. Movement Coordination Mechanism

Integral to the MCA is the Movement Coordination Structure (as per the strategic, operational, and technical platforms) that cuts across many SMCC Priority areas. A key structure function relates to guiding the understanding of Movement components and ensuring those capacities are utilised to best effect.⁹³ The MCA proposes the establishment of 3-level coordination platforms:⁹⁴

1. *Strategic coordination platform* (tripartite coordination platform) is the permanent platform for Movement coordination.⁹⁵ It comprises the NS Secretary General (President where applicable), ICRC Head of Delegation, and IFRC Head of Delegation.
2. *Operational coordination platform* translates the strategic orientations into concrete operational plans.⁹⁶ It comprises the NS's operational leadership, the ICRC, and the IFRC, as well as PNS representatives operational in the country.
3. *Technical coordination platforms* are established by the operational coordination platform for every specific matter where more than two Movement Components are active.⁹⁷ It comprises technical staff from the NS and the other Movement Components.

The Movement coordination structure in Ukraine is clear and is depicted in Figure 1 below.



The Ukraine three-level coordination structure was considered highly relevant. However, the

⁹³ Guidance indicates the 'mechanism must be set up and maintained at all times, to ensure regular and smooth exchange of information and discussion as well as serving decision-making purposes, including assessments of needs of affected people, strategic and operational plans to respond to those needs, and the HNS' needs for investment and support to further its development priorities'.

⁹⁴ MCA template guidance.

⁹⁵ Its principal role is to create a safe space for dialogue, build trust and foster a mindset conducive to collaborative and inclusive coordination. It sets the strategic orientation of how the Movement will collaborate and cooperate in the country.

⁹⁶ Based on assessed needs of affected people, and oversees their implementation through inclusive and problem-solving coordination, quality of actions, efficiency of operations and accountability of behaviours.

⁹⁷ Each of the technical platforms aims to ensure alignment between the programmes of the various Movement Components in a given field of activity by combining relevant expertise and making the best complementary use of the Movement's collective assets.

strategic platform was not always functional (see 4.1.4.3) and characterised at times as somewhat dysfunctional due to parties focusing too narrowly on their own institutions' positioning/needs, rather than on 'collective' positioning. In addition, some PNSs felt IFRC strategic positioning did not always adequately represent wider PNS interests.

Operational platform functioning in Ukraine was reported to be much better, but at times inhibited by poor strategic information flow from the strategic platform. The Movement Emergency Operation Platform (MEOPS) (figure 1 above) was considered a good enabler for effective coordination and cooperation. Other reports⁹⁸ indicate good operational coordination at country level due to first round Surge Ops Managers being experienced in leveraging operational coordination mechanisms. Operational and technical coordination at the regional level, which guided the country level, however, was deemed less effective and attributed to overly complex hierarchies and some redundancy in Movement decision-making contributors.⁹⁹ Some technical functions (e.g. mobile health units; mental health and psychological support) performed better than others, but many suffered from a lack of follow on operational coherence post meetings.

In Pakistan, the Movement Coordination Structure was more ad hoc in nature and not formalised to the degree illustrated in figure 1. The NS as convenor enabled no strategic platform meetings during the emergency (despite attempts by IFRC as co-convenor). The NS attended only a limited number of operational/technical meetings, often due to staff being overwhelmed with response efforts as well as being 'triple-hatted' (despite partner best attempts to help the NS recruit new staff to support the emergency).

At a more strategic level beyond the country Movement Coordination Structure, the review established that while coordination and cooperation modalities were *largely* understood by stakeholders (previously cited exceptions aside) there were two issues of concern: (i) strategic coordination/guidance at the global level was unclear and poorly understood by many actors - a key issue being the need to clarify roles in the coordination mandate of IFRC in the Movement as stated earlier¹⁰⁰ (cf. 4.1.3.2); and (ii) country level stakeholders not having clarity on the coordination roles and responsibilities of the Regional and Global levels.¹⁰¹ In part, this may be explained by the fact that the Seville Agreement 2.0 was in the process of being negotiated or signed at the time of the emergencies.

4.1.4.6. Movement Contingency Plan

Given the rapidly changing dynamics in Ukraine it was simply felt too complicated and unrealistic to develop a full MCP. Instead, partners relied on a previously developed NS contingency plan focusing on safety and security to which partners contributed. No MCP was developed for Pakistan. The PRCS were reported to have been working on a 'preparedness operation plan' with partner support, but coordination challenges between PRCS HQ and its branches meant little progress had been made. The MCP was considered the least relevant of SMCC tools.

4.1.4.7. Mini-summit and Mini-summit decision table

Ukraine held two Mini-Summits, the first (24.02.2022) was critical to framing the initial emergency response; the second was a follow-up summit (part 1 and 2 -1.4.2022 and 4.4.2022) that helped determine if the initial February decisions remained valid.¹⁰² The decision table contained clear

98 IFRC IOR Ukraine and Impacted Countries report March 2023.

99 *Ibid.*

100 This review findings was also highlighted in the IFRC IOR Ukraine and Impacted Countries report March 2023.

101 In June 2022, some five months into the operation, the Council of Delegates held a meeting and adopted Seville 2.0 as a new resolution on the coordination between the ICRC, HNS, and the IFRC, redefining each agency's role in conflicts. Source: IFRC IOR Ukraine and Impacted Countries report March 2023. This review echoes the report's recommendation to clearly define a ToR for Global/Regional Strategic Coordination for multi-country, complex emergencies.

102 An updated scope of involvement followed: URCS leads in areas of Ukraine that are less affected by intense military operations, in the fields of emergency response activities including Health, Cash, RFL and Relief efforts, supported by the ICRC as co-convenor, and by IFRC and partners, as requested by URCS. ICRC leads in areas of

outcomes captured from the Mini-Summit process, which were shared with Movement partners that had a special interest in the operation. This process contributing to a better coordinated response than would have otherwise been possible. The summit process for Ukraine was rated as highly relevant aided by having a clear, simple, understandable, and accessible range of tools¹⁰³; as well as the Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisor (MCO) role 'who helped put everything in place' (see 4.1.4.9).

There was no formal Mini-Summit held in Pakistan, but rather a series of informal IFRC, ICRC and PNS meetings (no NS attendance). Meetings did not have agendas, and no minutes or follow-up action points were produced.

4.1.4.8. Joint statement

Considered by many KIs to be one of the most relevant SMCC tools, a Joint Statement is ideally drafted by the HNS, IFRC and the ICRC following an emergency, and as soon as possible after the Mini-Summit has been held.

In Ukraine, the two Joint Statements confirm the importance of the SMCC spirit and tools, with the February version being specifically explicit about the volatility of the situation, the lack of clarity as to needs, effective capacities, and partners' ability to operate. Importantly, the 'Ask' requested Movement partners to ensure alignment on public communication around the crisis to project a coherent Movement narrative (see further 4.1.6); and for Movement partners to avoid sending unsolicited goods and/or personnel until expressly agreed by the Movement Strategic Platform (a request not always adhered to thus challenging the SMCC spirit of *predictability*). The July Statement provides greater clarity on convenor/co-convenor roles and interpretation of key Seville Agreement 2.0 articles.

The Joint Statement in Pakistan was produced some four months after the emergency, a delay which was felt to have contributed to coordination misinterpretations and a lack of clarity as to how the emergency response would be managed.¹⁰⁴ The lack of a Mini-Summit certainly impeded timely Joint Statement development, however, once developed, the Statement was seen as particularly relevant for 'informing the outside world' and showcasing to partners a collective Movement. In Pakistan, some KIs felt a more pragmatic approach to Joint Statement development would be beneficial, noting that producing something so definitive and early is a tall order given that emergency contexts are initially frequently uncertain and rapidly evolving.

4.1.4.9. Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisor

In Ukraine, a MCO was deployed on 16 March 2022 for 2.5 months. Although deployed a little later than desirable¹⁰⁵, the role was well received/appreciated by partners and seen as a positive contribution to the emergency response, and thus considered highly relevant. The MCO faced challenges however, which included: broader Movement politics relating to Seville 2.0 discussions; different ICRC/IFRC planning and mobilisation timeframes; triple reporting lines to the NS Secretary General and heads of IFRC/ICRC in-country structures; the perceived non-neutrality of the MCO (by some); and the NS being unable to take a more leading role on cooperation modalities due to a lack of internal capacity.

Additional MCO challenges in Ukraine related to a lack of PNS cooperation specialists, and the deployment of the IFRC Membership Coordinator for the region adding a level of confusion that some saw as a parallel role with a parallel structure, causing unnecessary competition between

Ukraine that are affected by intense military operations, supported by URCS as co-convenor, as well as on IHL, protection and detention issues across the whole country.

¹⁰³ The fact that the toolkit was refreshed/rebuilt by GVA at the conflict outset greatly assisted meaningful application.

¹⁰⁴ One non-in country PNS commented on how challenging it was to find out who was involved in the various coordination levels, particularly the key operational one.


¹⁰⁵ The relatively slow deployment of the Ukraine MCO was due in part to senior decision-makers in all Movement components being occupied with managing the response/deploying 'lifesaving' critical staff.

ICRC and IFRC Movement coordination mechanisms.¹⁰⁶ Pakistan did not request a MCO principally due to ICRC not being active in flood affected areas outside its unique area of operation.

While the SMCC guidelines for MCOs are clear¹⁰⁷, the MCO's pure advisory/facilitation role was felt insufficient to ensure effective coordination and cooperation modalities. Some KIs felt a higher profile role, with a specific mandate to support Heads of Delegation (HoD)/sub HoDs to implement SMCC in practice would be beneficial in future emergencies, and contributing to a better strategisation of SMCC Ambitions. Encouragingly, the Coordination Group had the activity to revise the MCO concept to ensure future capacity to deploy in all large-scale emergencies (SMCC PoA objective 2.2) and the future of this approach is due for active consideration.

4.1.4.10. Movement Picture

The Movement Picture is a visual map of the presence and operations of the Movement in a specific country context and/or region. See below for sample excerpt or [here](#) for full example.¹⁰⁸



Source: IFRC. Movement Picture: Ukraine and impacted countries crisis, February to May 2022.
20/06/2022

In Ukraine three Movement pictures were produced (2.2022-10.2022, 6.2022, 10.2023) along with a more comprehensive Movement overview document.¹⁰⁹ No Movement picture or similar detail was produced for Pakistan.

An overall compilation challenge in Ukraine related to a lack of common data/indicator alignment between the ICRC and the IFRC, which resulted in an only partial picture of collective response and impact. The product's utility/value was also questioned, specifically regarding how the product was used *versus* the effort invested in creating it.¹¹⁰ This said, the tool was appreciated for its mobilisation potential, and for gathering essential Movement information that would not

106 See also: ICRC-IFRC Review of the Movement Coordination Officer Function. January 2023.

107 The MCO does not replace or substitute existing mechanisms, has no decision-making authority, and does not coordinate the Movement's response. Their purpose is to act as a mediator, facilitator and adviser who supports the managers leading the coordination process.

108 A visual map of the presence and operations of the Movement in a specific country context and/or region.

109 One year of the Russia-Ukraine international armed conflict (2022). Additional reports were also produced for Ukraine.

110 One knowledgeable KI felt the URCS had never used the picture.

exist otherwise. Overall, KIs were divided on the relevance of the tool, but this might be to do with the fact that few KIs knew what the Movement picture was.

4.1.4.11. Coordinated appeals and communication products

The intention through this tool is to ensure that appeals are coordinated between Movement components thus presenting the Movement's planned activities and funding needs towards donors, stakeholders, and the public in a coherent manner. The aim is to avoid financial competition between Movement components and to ensure complementarity and efficiency. The relevance of coordinated appeals could not be established as only a draft version was produced for Ukraine (none for Pakistan).

A key challenge with coordinating appeals is that IFRC and ICRC have different appeal processes, which makes establishing a complementary, joined-up narrative difficult. The ICRC for example has its annual appeals process¹¹¹, whereas the IFRC employs the Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF)¹¹² and/or Emergency Appeals.¹¹³ The coordination process for appeals is further complicated by a lack of joint IFRC and ICRC appeal terminology.¹¹⁴

The *timeliness* of coordinating appeals is further complicated by IFRC's ability to launch appeals rapidly (within 48 hours), whereas the ICRC adopt a more longitudinal approach to appeal development. Learning from this has contributed to IFRC (Emergency Appeals and Marketing) acknowledging that a more robust approach is required, and work on standard operating procedures for the two institutions is currently underway.

4.1.4.12. Overall toolkit relevance

Overall, the SMCC toolkit was seen as highly relevant and purposeful. The approach was considered 'correct', with the tools adding value by provided a formal working coordination and cooperation framework beyond the informal but well-established personal working relationships at key operational levels.¹¹⁵ This confirms the SMCC's toolkit importance to resilience/business continuity dimensions. However, the toolkits relevance was diminished by the fact it is applied electively¹¹⁶ rather than mandatory when it comes to use-in-emergencies. This was considered a weakness in the SMCC approach as highlighted by KI:

'The elective approach isn't working, and we – IFRC and ICRC – feel that we can apply what we want and just hope for the best. There is no higher force that holds people accountable. It's just an ad hoc thing'.

There may also be opportunity to simplify the coordination mechanism through the strategic platform tasking operational/technical platform functions only as and when needed, allowing

111 The annual budget is based on the objectives set for the year and aims to cover activities from 1 January to 31 December. All budgets are established on a yearly basis. The ICRC budget and appeal structure is divided into operational (field) and headquarters activities. The ICRC seeks funding to cover the costs of its field activities worldwide through its appeals for Operations; it uses the appeals for HQ to seek funding for all activities carried out at its headquarters, which cover operational, legal, communications and administrative support for field activities and other functions, such as resource mobilization, human resource management and financial management. During the year, adjustments to the initial appeals may be made in the form of budget extensions, in response to unforeseen needs requiring increased humanitarian action. See e.g. REM 2022/145.

112 The DREF is a central IFRC fund through which it can release funds rapidly to National Societies for early action and immediate disaster response.

113 The IFRC launch Emergency Appeals for big and complex disasters and crises that affect lots of people who will need long-term support to recover. It articulates how the IFRC plans to respond to an emergency situation where there are significant needs for which international assistance is required. An emergency appeal is always based on a request from a member National Society and is usually issued on the basis of a needs assessment. It consists of a narrative and a corresponding budget.

114 See: IFRC and ICRC. Lesson-learning review of the 'One International Appeal' modality Part of the SMCC process (February 2019) for a more detailed analysis of the appeal process in Ukraine.

115 People noting that while well-functioning at operational levels such relationships cannot always be relied upon as staff change and people move on to different functions and/or organisations.

116 Not always applied in practice.

structure to organically emerge, as well as shrink, as the emergency evolves.

Key learnings related to Priority 4:

1. SMCC preparation and application is conditional on NS leadership understanding and buy-in.
2. NSs in both contexts found it challenging to accomplish their full convenor roles as expected.
3. The SMCC initiative (conceptual understanding) becomes more dilute the further it travels from Geneva.
4. The occupier of the co-convenor role might not necessarily be the 'strongest' actor in the partnership arrangement. This has implications for 'power and influence' dynamics.¹¹⁷
5. MCP's might be better suited to smaller scale emergencies with less Movement partners; and considered more a progress planning document than a definitive plan.
6. Mini-Summits and Joint Statements are valuable tools to framing the initial emergency response.
7. The MCO function has a greater coordination potential than is currently being utilised with a case made for mandatory/automatic deployment in any large-scale emergency.
8. An elective approach to the SMCC toolkit can diminish relevance and accountability.
9. There is opportunity to simplify the SMCC coordination mechanism.
10. Effectively supporting NS leadership transition is key to SMCC.

4.1.5. Priority 5: Promoting complementary domestic and international response while ensuring the coherent and sustained development of local capacities¹¹⁸

Priority 5 findings

1. In Ukraine, SMCC tool application permitted the NS a much clearer and stronger control of the resource mobilization and localization agenda.
2. Different partner funding modalities negatively weighed on good resource mobilization practice.

A detailed analysis of Priority 5 was inhibited due to the discontinuation of the Local Action MIT, meaning it was not possible to fully establish what outcomes had been achieved for this Priority. However, in terms of Ukraine, the best example of Movement commitment to Priority 5 is exhibited through the URCS's clear lead vision and strategy for its *One Plan 2023-2025*, in which the NS confirms its and the Movement's vision for localization, including 'piloting the SMCC process, and implementing the Seville Agreement 2.0', a process clearly guided by the SMCC initiative.

The URCS further emphasises Priority 5 commitment by noting the 'opportunity to further shift the Movement's footprint in Ukraine towards a response that is led by the Host National Society' - noting that ICRC's conventionally mandated response cannot be led by the NS.¹¹⁹ While it was not possible to analyse partner commitments to the URCS One Plan in depth (as it is currently under development), multiple PNS KIs referred to the plan during as a defining focus point for them in helping fulfil 'a collective commitment' toward securing this Priority.¹²⁰

In Pakistan, resource mobilization coordination materialised 'organically' through what was described as 'an indirect reliance on and contribution towards predictable tools used by IFRC',

¹¹⁷ Power being based on positional authority and influence being based on relationships.

¹¹⁸ Full: Promoting complementary domestic and international response while ensuring the coherent and sustained development of local capacities, including in resource mobilization and in alignment with the localization agenda, emphasizing the need for operations that are as local as possible and as international as necessary.

¹¹⁹ Source: URCS One Plan 2023-2025.

¹²⁰ Detailed resource mobilization information for Ukraine was not forthcoming at the time of report submission.

the following of which are examples:¹²¹

- Partner calls: in-country (PNS and ICRC attended) that served as sources of information for donors, some of whom later funded multilateral and bilateral support operations.
- Diplomatic Roundtables: convened by both the IFRC country delegation and IFRC Geneva.
- Emergency Appeal and accompanying Operational Strategy: the Federation-wide approach was complemented by PNS resource mobilization approaches.

Assessing commitments to the resource mobilization and localization agenda in Pakistan was more complicated, not least because the HNS was not a lead or full partner in the alignment process (largely ignoring Movement country coordinating mechanisms) and was said to favour ICRC's more predictable funding model over IFRC's 'less confirmed' one. Anecdotal evidence indicated that this negatively impacted overall Movement-wide resource mobilization coordination efforts as PRCS personnel tended to support partners along 'funding loyalty' lines rather than taking an holistic view of Movement contributions.

Key learnings related to Priority 5:

1. The more the HNS leads the resource mobilization and localization agenda, the stronger its control of the outcomes.
2. Different partner funding modalities can conspire against good resource mobilization coordination practice (thus reinforcing the 'divide and rule' approach).

4.1.6. Priority 6: *Enhancing the scalability of the response*¹²²

Priority 6 findings

1. Opportunities were missed to secure response multiplier effects and leverage synergies due to lack of consideration for other cooperation modalities than those used.
2. The media related controversies centring on the ICRC negatively affected perceptions of SMCC efforts.

Few KIs were able to illustrate partner commitments to Priority 6, with the only two comments being registered at a very general level - 'reinforcing the position of the Red Pillar through the SMCC initiative' and 'aspiring to positioning the Movement as a key global responder' (the latter comment being made in reference to the Libya dam crisis). This might be to do with the perceived abstract nature of this priority when compared to the previous five 'more tangible' ones. Instead, what some KIs noted was the 'standard' way in which Movement cooperation primarily manifests itself in emergency situations - bilaterally or multilaterally, with other partnership modalities such as consortia or more shared leadership approaches being less common.¹²³ While this may stray into the realm of Membership Coordination, it nonetheless has implications for resource mobilization and the localization agenda, not least as some PNSs sit on significant resources while others struggle to sustain operations in increasing challenging circumstances.

One event in Ukraine, however, that severely impacted aspirations to fulfilling Priority 6 (as well as other SMCC priorities and ambitions) centred on the media related controversies of false narratives and disinformation campaigns that mostly affected the ICRC, as the following excerpt from a special note on the Ukraine crisis explains:

'... social media posts and a global news release have highlighted the risks posed to the

¹²¹ Source: IFRC Global Strategic Planning & Reporting Centre email to consultant 30.10.23.

¹²² Full: Enhancing the scalability of the response in large-scale crises in a manner that reinforces the position of the Movement as a key global responder.

¹²³ The concept of Shared Leadership (e.g. one lead PNS works with the HNS, while other PNSs play an active role in technical areas) was mentioned by several KIs, but this appeared to be aspirational rather than what took place in practice.

Movement by deliberate, targeted attacks using false narratives and disinformation. Fully recognizing that such a social media controversy can evolve very rapidly, the ICRC will continue to respond to the false information or the misinformation through engagement on the social media networks, through posting on its website, through press releases or speaking notes shared on the Movement's usual communication platforms'.¹²⁴

In terms of Movement emergency response and SMCC, in today's hyper-connected societies, fast paced social media communication, fake news and deliberate misinformation, it is increasingly important to be able to regulate narrative when it has potential for getting dangerously out of control.

Key learnings related to Priority 6:

1. Multiplier effects could be secured by PNSs leveraging synergies through consortia and other cooperation modalities.
2. Priority 6 may provide inspiration for outcome indicator modelling for the SMCC initiative.
3. Ensuring effective response in future emergencies and crises will increasingly rely on being able to influence the narrative discourse (past, present, and future) surrounding the emergency/crisis.

4.2. SMCC Ambitions 1-3

The SMCC initiative has three ambitions:¹²⁵

- *Ambition 1:* Change practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination.
- *Ambition 2:* Deliver well-coordinated and predictable operational responses.
- *Ambition 3:* Reinforce the visibility of the collective response.

The review sought to identify the relevance of each ambition and the extent to which they have been fulfilled in the two emergency contexts. *Italics* are used to highlight the aspirational aspects of each Ambition.

4.2.1. Ambition 1: Change practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination

In terms of changing practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination in Ukraine, the positive extent to which the *coordination spirit* was manifested and fostered across the Movement was primarily felt to be more impactful at country level (including among technical levels/platforms in neighbouring countries), and less so at Regional Office and Geneva levels. *Coordination competencies* at country level were strengthened (primarily through the NS taking the lead and strong coordination platforms such as MEOPs). *Accountability* for coordination was felt not to have significantly increased.

In Pakistan, the positive extent to which the *coordination spirit* was embedded and fostered across the Movement was a main driver in partners collectively responding to the emergency in the face of limited NS guidance/engagement. *Coordination spirit* within the IFRC APRO was sensed to be good although limited to senior echelons. Coordination between the relevant ICRC and IFRC Regional Offices was considered mixed: at times rated good - particularly presently although primarily outside of the Pakistan context - but also at times non-optimal, as per a lack of coordination on appeals processes.¹²⁶ Country level *coordination competencies* were felt not to

¹²⁴ Source: Special Note no. 2022/4 to all National Societies Ukraine Crisis: misinformation, disinformation and reputation issues. See also here for example of negative impact.

¹²⁵ The Ambitions guide the SMCC PoA Objectives and references to PoA achievements/challenges (Section 4.1.2) and will not be duplicated here.

¹²⁶ As per the example of the Sri Lanka complex emergency <https://www.ifrc.org/emergency/sri-lanka-complex-emergency>

have significantly strengthened¹²⁷ and there has been no marked increase in *accountability* for coordination.

A key strategic challenge straddling both contexts related to insufficient strategic investment ‘thinking’ for operationalising SMCC. This is key to moving the initiative forward at a strategic level (in all contexts, current and future), and a clearer framing of SMCC could be beneficial. The ambition was considered very relevant in both contexts but largely unfulfilled. The main enablers/challenges to Ambition 1 are shown below:

Ukraine

Enablers:

- URCS awareness of the importance of SMCC in helping frame and shape the emergency response.
- URCS being a SMCC Lab and leading on SMCC during the emergency.
- At country level, an overall positive attitude towards SMCC and adhering to the SMCC spirit particularly at MEOP/technical levels.
- A general willingness/openness of most partners to share essential information.
- MCO deployment (although time limited).

Challenges:

- A tendency for partners to focus on their own positioning/needs during the emergency.
- Having to deal with Movement ‘politics’ and the negative impact this had on coordination and cooperation.
- Inexperienced surge capacity in a context where building trust with the HNS and NSD was a major challenge.

Pakistan

Enabler:

- An acceptance and willingness amongst ICRC, IFRC and PNSs to work collaboratively in the absence of any NS guidance and invoking SMCC spirit whilst not necessarily deploying any tools.

Challenges:

- A disengaged NS from the SMCC process prior to the emergency.¹²⁸
- No active promotion of SMCC tools by convenor or co-convenor during the emergency.
- Inability of partners to engage the NS in SMCC activities during the emergency.
- Partners working on parallel type programmes and not leveraging available synergies.
- Limited APRO mid-level coordination to support Country Office SMCC efforts.

4.2.2. Ambition 2: Deliver well-coordinated and predictable operational responses

This was a highly relevant ambition in Ukraine. Good *operational practice* was clearly supported by SMCC tools and guidance with many partners agreeing that the response would have been far more chaotic without the tools: as one KI summarises:

‘The response was quite effective and readily attributable to SMCC. Without SMCC it would be a total mess. It provided a really important framework for the operation that would otherwise have been really difficult’.

Some systems across the Movement were more aligned and interoperable than others, for

¹²⁷ There were reports of minor trainings taking place, but these have not resulted in any meaningful change.

¹²⁸ Lack of ‘peace time’ SMCC building.

example logistics. An example of how *operational delivery* improved accounting for real-time *lessons learned* was noted following the Nova Kakhovka dam event¹²⁹, which, while not perfect, was felt to be more efficiently organised based on learning from the early stages of the response.

Given few SMCC tools were deployed in Pakistan, it cannot be said they contributed significantly to good *operational practice* (a generous interpretation is that tools were deployed more in spirit than actuality). In this context, the SMCC spirit was considered to be more relevant, however, this could be a justification for the absence of tool deployment. Positively, *operational delivery* was significantly enhanced by accounting for *lessons learned* (as evidenced by reference to the Flood Response in Pakistan 2022 lessons learning log from 2014 onwards), but learning from previous reports about a lack of PRCS leadership capacity for critical emergency processes appear not to have been acted on.¹³⁰ There was little evidence of *systems across the Movement* being aligned in the response.¹³¹

The main enablers/challenges to Ambition 2 are listed below:

Ukraine <u>Enablers:</u> • MEOPs coordination work. • NS being a SMCC laboratory and leading on SMCC during the emergency. • PNSs known for a more traditional bilateral approach subscribing to the SMCC spirit. <u>Challenges:</u> • Overwhelming scale of the emergency and unpredictable evolution. • Partner tendency to focus on their own positioning/needs during the emergency. • PNS tendency to privilege direct operations (avoiding Movement coordination) as a means to use funding more rapidly. • Insufficient SMCC knowledge among mainly newly deployed personnel. • Lack of senior management adherence to SMCC principles. • Certain PNSs acting ‘solo’ without reference to established coordination mechanisms (this however improved over time). • Absence of outcome indicators to determine how well coordinated the response was. • Lack of capacities/skills to frame coordination efforts.
Pakistan <u>Enablers:</u> • IFRC, ICRC and PNS awareness/acceptance that in the absence of NS SMCC leadership they had to convene to coordinate the operational response; and a willingness to come together to this end. • Willingness of IFRC, ICRC and PNS to coordinate response efforts through SMCC spirit in the absence of formally deployed tools. <u>Challenges:</u> • Limited SMCC preparation/planning pre-emergency. • Lack of coordination structure between PRCS HQ and branches. • Protocol ‘bucking’ e.g. NS Chairman engaging with IFRC Geneva in attempts to influence/overturn IFRC Country Office decisions.

129 The collapse of the Nova Kakhovka Dam in southern Ukraine on June 6 resulted in a devastating flood, impacting numerous communities.

130 IFRC and ICRC NSD in Emergencies report (2019); and ICRC/PRCS SAF PoA Review Workshop 2019 Report.

131 As noted by one KI: ‘In Pakistan coordination is more intuitive - we don’t look at the tools we just do it. SMCC isn’t really known by the partners’.

- Disregard for numerous SMCC coordination protocols by PRCS leadership.
- Lack of PRCS leadership understanding for convenor role.
- PNSs working on parallel programmes in Pakistan.
- Slow information sharing between IFRC country office and PNSs regarding security/response transparency issues (negatively impacting trust levels).

4.2.3. Ambition 3: Reinforcing visibility of the collective response

Efforts made towards reinforcing visibility of the collective response including coordinated communication efforts have been considered in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.5 and 4.1.6 and will not be repeated here. Suffice to say, aspects proved challenging and highlights a key area in which future attention will need to be focused. To illustrate, while not entirely divorced from the two emergencies (although beyond review scope), several KIs posed the question: what does it really mean to have the NS at the centre of the response when there was potential conflict of interest, particularly with regard to upholding key Fundamental Principles (impartiality, neutrality, independence) in light of the NS's auxiliary role to government, and especially when such governments do not always respect International Humanitarian Law? The reviewer leaves this question for others to consider.

Ambition 3 was highlighted as being the least relevant during the review. Not because it was considered less relevant, but similar to Priority 6, it had a less tangible feel than did Ambitions 1 and 2, and it too might be considered as an SMCC outcome indicator.

4.3. Associated SMCC findings

Additional useful review findings beyond primary scope:

4.3.1. Movement Implementation Teams

MITs have a clear interoperability role as illustrated through the SMCC PoA and are thus relevant to supporting all SMCC Priority areas.¹³² Numerous MIT enablers/challenges are documented in other reports.¹³³ Key issues raised during this review related to MITs being too resource intensive/process focused (rather than purpose led), and too Membership inclusive.¹³⁴ This extended to some views that MIT membership should comprise principally IFRC and ICRC personnel, only bringing in NS staff on an 'as needs basis'. The inclusion of senior staff in MITs was at times felt to have inhibited effective functioning due to their absence during busy periods (which contributed to team demotivation).¹³⁵ Analysis indicates that performance and progress of the various MITs towards supporting SMCC Ambitions was/is mixed – some teams are advancing well whilst other teams are 'static', suggesting that MIT functioning is not optimal, and a 'latest status' review could prove beneficial (recognising that analysis was undertaken early 2023).

4.3.2. Decision-making hierarchies

The different IFRC and ICRC and response decision-making hierarchies were found to inhibit effective Movement cooperation and coordination, particularly when it came to essential joint decision-making central to framing the Ukraine emergency response. One frequent observation

¹³² In the PoA, MITs is recorded as 'moving forward with delays'. Following December 2022, the MITs on Scalability and Local action were dismantled.

¹³³ See: Narrative Explainer - SMCC 2.0 Optimisation Strategy (1). The report noted that while advances have taken place on several important MIT issues, tangible results and deliverables are mostly yet to be realized. Hindrances to MIT output included resource availability that was strained due to Covid-19 and the Ukraine crisis, diverting resources away from SMCC files. Momentum had also been lost in some of the MITs with often only the co-chairs and IFRC/ICRC resources available.

¹³⁴ The Competencies MIT alone runs to some 16 members, many of whom are listed as 'not active'.

¹³⁵ The 2022 SMCC progress report noted similar concerns and challenges faced were associated with the lack of available dedicated resources, slow engagement, at times, from MIT members due to competing priorities (among them COVID-19) and, in some cases, changes in the members or co-chairs.

related to decisions reached at country level being subject to change by the IFRC Geneva/Regional Office (the aspect of decision-making is a complex matter and was addressed more substantively in Section 4.1.4.5).

Drawing on wider learning examples that highlight similar decision-making issues, parallels can be drawn with the Movement Response to the 9th and 10th Ebola Outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo operation (2020)¹³⁶, in which gaps in understanding and communication between the IFRC and the ICRC relating to *decision-making* impacted the timely and effective delivery of the response, causing delays, non-delivery of critical services, and problems for field teams.

Different organisational structures also impacted effective coordination at country level as one Ukraine KI noted: *‘There was a discombobulation of coordination architecture between IFRC and ICRC. It took three weeks for me to find who my counterpart was in ICRC in order to establish clarity on coordination alignment’*. The distinct IFRC-ICRC architectures were also thought to bear influence on SMCC preparedness levels, as well as how SMCC gets ‘activated’ at country level during emergencies.

5. Conclusion

The key learnings from the review are as follows:

Priority 1 (data management):

1. A lack of open data sharing between partners negatively weighs on efforts to establish accurate Movement footprints and improve operational response.
2. Different IFRC and ICRC budgeting processes make coordinating appeals challenging.
3. The high amounts of funding pouring into Ukraine and the pressure on PNSs to have visibility in high profile areas was predictable.
4. SMCC potential is being limited by a lack of joint outcome/impact indicators.
5. A Host NS with good SMCC understanding is in a stronger position to coordinate its partners.

Priority 2 (systems interoperability):

1. Logs interoperability objectives and activities provide a useful template for other MIT interoperability aspirations, contributing to a more strategized Priority 2.
2. Improving resource mobilisation table processes and early cross-institution alignment is key to interoperability and securing a more effective/efficient response.

Priority 3 (understanding capacity):

1. The initial lack of IFRC/ICRC ‘coordination positioning’ clarity affected the partners ability to provide a more coherent response.
2. MCPs are not thorough – this limits real time understanding of how capacities of Movement components can be utilised to contribute to a response.
3. Few KIs expected MCPs to have utility.

Priority 4 (SMCC tool application):

1. SMCC preparation and application is conditional on NS leadership understanding and buy-in.
2. NSs in both contexts found it challenging to accomplish their full convenor roles as expected.
3. The SMCC initiative (conceptual understanding) becomes more dilute the further it

¹³⁶ See: Lessons Learnt Review. The Movement Response to the 9th and 10th Ebola Outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). IFRC Africa Regional Office. 27 8 2020. Also: <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/lessons-learnt-review-movement-response-9th-and-10th-ebola-outbreaks-democratic-republic-congo-drc>

travels from Geneva.

4. The occupier of the co-convenor role might not necessarily be the 'strongest' actor in the partnership arrangement. This has implications for 'power and influence' dynamics.¹³⁷
5. MCP's might be better suited to smaller scale emergencies with less Movement partners; and considered more a progress planning document than a definitive plan.
6. Mini-Summits and Joint Statements are valuable tools to framing the initial emergency response.
7. The MCO function has a greater coordination potential than is currently being utilised with a case made for mandatory/automatic deployment in any large-scale emergency.
8. An elective approach to the SMCC toolkit can diminish relevance and accountability.
9. There is opportunity to simplify the SMCC coordination mechanism.
10. Effectively supporting NS leadership transition is key to SMCC.

Priority 5 (response complementary):

1. The more the HNS leads the resource mobilization and localization agenda, the stronger its control of the outcomes.
2. Different partner funding modalities can conspire against good resource mobilization coordination practice (thus reinforcing the 'divide and rule' approach).

Priority 6 (response scalability):

1. Multiplier effects could be secured by PNSs leveraging synergies through consortia and other cooperation modalities.
2. Priority 6 may provide inspiration for outcome indicator modelling for the SMCC initiative.
3. Ensuring effective response in future emergencies and crises will increasingly rely on being able to influence the narrative discourse (past, present, and future) surrounding the emergency/crisis.

In terms of whether the SMCC initiative has been effective in achieving its intended coordination objectives and efficient in facilitating the better use of Movement resources (funds, expertise, and time) at operational levels, the picture is overall complex and contrasting. In Ukraine for example, the application of tools to frame the emergency response (including preparation) and the positive impact this had on coordinating and helping lead operations lends towards a **good effectiveness rating** at operational level, whereas the same cannot be said for Pakistan.

In terms of efficiency in Ukraine, unfortunately, due to the unprecedented scale of the response and ensuing coordination challenges that centred on an inadequate understanding of the ideal coordination mechanism for Movement actors, the use of Movement resources cannot be said to have been efficient (simply as coordination was not optimised under a single plan¹³⁸). An efficiency judgement on Pakistan cannot be made as SMCC tool application to frame the response was extremely minimal.

Aside from the multiple SMCC process-type challenges related to e.g. effective data sharing, MIT functioning, coordinated appeal alignment, effective interoperability, tool application etc. raised in the synthesis/findings section that affected both contexts, the biggest factor preventing more efficacious Movement coordination in Ukraine was the fact that the operation started in the middle of the revision of the Seville Agreement process, being affected by both operational realities and 'political wrangling' at the senior leadership levels.¹³⁹ This negatively impacted the higher-level normative coordination aspirations as per Seville Agreement 2.0, had adverse implications for ensuring a well-coordinated operational response, and will continue to affect Movement response

¹³⁷ Power being based on positional authority and influence being based on relationships.

¹³⁸ Examples include initial IFRC Surge being less than efficient. Positively, overall coordination later improved with the advent of the URCS One Plan 2023-2025.

¹³⁹ Indeed, the SMCC 2.0 Resolution noted that 'coordination remains a complex endeavour, and principal challenges include ensuring that the right mindset is cultivated across the Movement, that political leadership is appropriate and sustained, that the benefits of coordination are well understood . . .' (p.2).

efforts unless resolved.¹⁴⁰ Frustrating for many KIs was the fact that such politicking was happening at all, when given the frequency and magnitude of humanitarian emergencies and crises, Movement energy (funds, expertise, and time) should be focused on the IFRC and ICRC coming together rather than drifting apart.¹⁴¹

There will be many reasons why the above might be happening. Of overall central importance is the recognition that the IFRC and ICRC are not ‘as one’ when it comes to interpreting the Seville Agreement 2.0 or applying SMCC tools. Contributing factors include the ICRC being perceived by some interviewees to have a ‘limited SMCC mindset’ because of its priority focus on delivering on its conventional mandate.¹⁴² In contrast, the IFRC is better equipped to play a coordination role, but nonetheless was seen to have an overly transactional focus on Membership Coordination when interpreting the Seville Agreement 2.0.

6. Recommendations

This section details the **key** strategic recommendations distilled from the lessons learned contained in the Synthesis (Findings) section of the report.¹⁴³

A short detail is included to help explain each recommendation. Following accepted practice, all recommendations leave room for fine-tuning in terms of final wording and the implementation approach to be adopted by implementers and users. The ICRC and IFRC will need to consider to whom the main responsibilities for implementing each recommendation should fall, as well as realistic timings. Facilitated cross-organisation workshops would be useful in help implement select recommendations.

In formulating the recommendations, the term ‘should consider’ is purposefully and mostly used in preference to ‘must’ or ‘should’ as the recommendations were distilled from two contexts and might not be applicable to SMCC more widely.

	Recommendation	Detail and rationale
Strategic level		
1	The ICRC and IFRC should collectively agree how the SMCC initiative will be mainstreamed in practice within each organisation to ensure functional complementarity.	Drawn from: conclusion. This involves agreeing how such implementation is informed by the normative framework for Movement coordination (the Seville Agreement 2.0). There is a need to resolve how both organisations inter-face with each other to seek alignment and agree on communications and decision-making processes. See Recommendation 2.

140 The reviewer was alerted to similar ‘wranglings’ taking place in Libya following flooding in the wake of Storm Daniel and the collapse of two dams near the city of Derna. See: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/libya-people-hit-devastating-floods-need-your-help> and <https://www.ifrc.org/press-release/libya-floods-ifrc-announces-chf-10-million-appeal-urgent-relief-efforts>

141 The main ‘sticking points’, as the reviewer understands, appear to be Seville Agreement 2.0 Articles 5.2; 5.4.1; and 6. It is beyond the remit of this review to explore this issue further. The review acknowledges these issues are recognised by IFRC/ICRC senior management with efforts underway to address them.

142 Acknowledging that the ICRC has to deliver both on its conventional operational mandate as well as on its coordination role, whereas the IFRC’s mandate is NS coordination, including National Society Development, in support of Host NSs.

143 Readers may also draw additional suggestions/recommendations from the key leanings (which would be too numerous and detailed to include here).

	Recommendation	Detail and rationale
2	The ICRC and IFRC should consider invoking a protocol for all large-scale emergencies that requires the ICRC Director of Operations and the IFRC Under Secretary General - National Society Development and Operations Coordination to convene and issue minimum SMCC parameters.	Drawn from conclusions. In essence, this might involve the two positions immediately convening following receipt of the Mini-Summit decision table and Joint Statement, and to endorse institutionally - based on country level advice/decisions - how the emergency response will be framed e.g. co-convenor, security lead, logs/sector leads, geographical demarcations, roles and responsibilities, focal points for country, region and Geneva. This agreement (say 2 pages) then forms the guidance for all country operations henceforth (re-visitible) and should be issued within 48 hours.
3	The ICRC and IFRC should consider reframing the SMCC initiative into a clearer concept and clarify how it fits into the Movement operational coordination system established by the Seville Agreement 2.0, to facilitate better understanding and promotion of Movement coordination roles, expectations, and tools across the Movement.	Drawn from: Section 4.2.1; Priority 1 lessons 1 and 4; Priority 6 lesson 2; Section 4.1.3.2. For example, by adopting a strategic plan type structure - vision, mission, strategic orientation, strategic objectives, key success indicators etc.¹⁴⁴
4	The ICRC and IFRC should consider conducting a status review of the MITs with a view to informing a more streamlined, agile and resource efficient structure and supporting Plan of Action.	Drawn from: Priority 1 lessons 1 and 4. Not all MIT functioning is optimal, and a review - taking stock of what the MITs have achieved, what has not been achieved and why, and deciding how to move forward on the latter - could highlight efficiencies.
5	The ICRC and IFRC should consider reviewing the SMCC toolkit with a view to determining if some tools should be mandatory during emergencies/crises. ¹⁴⁵	Drawn from: Section 4.1.4; 4.1.4.6; and 4.1.4.12; Priority 3 lesson 2; Priority 4 lessons 6, 7, 9, and 10. Evidence indicates that a more efficient and effective response is possible when SMCC tools are used. Mandating tool use also increases accountability.
6	The ICRC and IFRC should ensure that that their managers in-country are performance managed to deliver on SMCC objectives or that a mandatory deployment of Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisors is made for all large-scale emergencies.	Drawn from: Section 4.1.4.9 and Priority 4 lesson 8. This will require training/equipping people in charge to deploy tools in large-scale emergencies. The MCO in Ukraine role was central to delivering SMCC and greatly

¹⁴⁴ This could involve looking to the innovation sector for tools on measuring efficiency on collective impact. e.g. https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/collaboration_and_collective_impact_-_geoff_mulgan.pdf

¹⁴⁵ In addition to tools that are already mandatory as per the Seville Agreement 2.0 e.g. Movement Coordination Agreement (Article 4.2).

	Recommendation	Detail and rationale
		facilitated effective response coordination. It is reasonable to assume this would be the case for other emergency/crisis contexts.
7	The Movement should step up SMCC and Seville Agreement 2.0 awareness raising and promotion (particularly for NS leadership/senior management levels).	Priority 4 lesson 1 and 4; and Priority 5 lesson 1. SMCC awareness across the Movement is not as strong as it needs to be. The IFRC and ICRC leadership/senior management should be at the front of this process.
8	The ICRC and IFRC should consider establishing a joint cadre of social media/media experts to proactively monitor media content in <u>all</u> emergency/crisis situations that involve a Movement response.	Priority 6 lesson 3. This function should be reflected in MCAs and Joint Statements. The purpose of the experts should, if necessary, to work to neutralise harmful media content. The ICRC and IFRC could look to established social media organisations for advice.
Pakistan		
9	The IFRC should commission and enable a series of structured 'Partner Review Talks' that engage all Movement partners in Pakistan as a mechanism for how to improve coordination and cooperation in the country.	Drawn from case study. Initially, Talks should be held bi-laterally e.g. IFRC-PRCS; IFRC-Norwegian Red Cross (followed by separate talks with all other PNSs); IFRC-ICRC etc. A final multi-lateral Partner Review Talk should be held from which a synthesis should be drawn. Results could feed into Recommendation 11 learning.
Ukraine		
10	The ICRC and IFRC should consider commissioning a lessons learned exercise focusing on understanding 'partnership dimensions' during the emergency response (including build up) in the Ukraine context.	Drawn from review reflection. Such analysis would complement this SMCC review and provide additional insights into the partnership dynamics that shape effective and efficient coordination and cooperation during large-scale emergencies. The results would help improve all future emergency responses.

Annex A: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference 28 April 2023

Lessons Learning Review (LLR) of Movement Coordination in Operations

Part of the Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) initiative. Commissioned by the joint ICRC and IFRC SMCC Steering Committee

SUMMARY

Purpose

The purpose of this lessons learning review is to highlight best practices and identify challenges of Movement coordination in large-scale emergencies to document practices and inform areas for improvement. More broadly, the objective is to ascertain whether Movement coordination has allowed improving the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's (the Movement) collective impact and its positioning through maximized resources, increased complementarity, and reduced duplication and competition.

The lessons learned review will focus on 2 major contexts (Ukraine and Pakistan) to identify the challenges and opportunities for Movement partners - the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and National Societies (NSs) - to coordinate and harmonize their response to emergencies.

Commissioner

This lessons learning review has been commissioned by the SMCC Steering Committee.

Audience

The primary audience for this review is the IFRC and the ICRC leadership and senior management, as well as the leadership of National Societies involved in the response to both contexts mentioned above. The secondary audience is all Movement components that have been or are likely to be involved in Movement-wide or multi-dimensional responses, and the Movement as a whole, as signatories to the SMCC initiative.

Management of the process

The daily management of this review will be carried out by the SMCC Coordination Group, which reports to the SMCC Steering Committee.

The SMCC Coordination will form a Joint Advisory Team (JMT), which will consist of:

- One member of each of the PMER teams of IFRC and ICRC
- Two senior staff of IFRC and ICRC, involved in the SMCC process
- Representatives of National Societies. For further reference, please see Section 8.

Timeframe

This LLR is expected to take place between April and November 2023.

Location

It is expected that there will be visits to selected locations in Ukraine and Pakistan. In certain locations, this will depend upon local context (including security conditions) and travel visas, and sometimes a remote working modality may be needed.

BACKGROUND

The Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) 2.0 has continued to show the relevance of the work that started in 2013, moving forward in six priority areas in close collaboration with all Movement components.

6 SMCC Priorities

- Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management to enhance operational response, ensure accountability, and provide timely information on the Movement footprint to internal and external stakeholders, to increase our overall humanitarian funding as well as reinforce the relevance and visibility of Movement operations
- Pursuing the development of the interoperability of systems to ensure agile and flexible support to operations

- Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components to contribute to a response, including the domestic competencies of National Societies, to ensure services are provided efficiently and meet the required standard of quality
- Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing existing SMCC tools to promote common planning and analysis and coordinated activities, reflecting on whether other tools are required, developing an evidence base on what works well in coordination, and considering different operational models to suit different contexts
- Promoting complementary domestic and international response while ensuring the coherent and sustained development of local capacities, including in resource mobilization and in alignment with the localization agenda, emphasizing the need for operations that are as local as possible and as international as necessary
- Enhancing the scalability of the response in large-scale crises in a manner that reinforces the position of the Movement as a key global responder.

It has been difficult to measure the results of the initiative in operations, and this LLR will be a contribution towards this end.

LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW PURPOSE AND SCOPE

From the onset of SMCC in 2013, mainly anecdotal evidence has been gathered from the implementation of Movement coordination in operations. It is therefore important to gain more substantive evidence of what is working and what is hampering Movement coordination through learning lessons from the two main Movement operational responses which have either started after and/or continued after the adoption of the new normative framework, the Seville Agreement 2.0. The contexts selected are Ukraine and Pakistan, where Movement coordination has been implemented recently, to provide a “reality check” and obtain a more detailed analysis of its implementation.

The lessons learned review is one exercise that will synthesize the evidence from two large-scale emergency responses. The review will provide a comparative assessment of the implementation of SMCC in these two contexts to triangulate findings. The LLR focuses on the implementation of the SMCC as a coordination mechanism between the IFRC, the ICRC, and National Societies, and in the context of the response to Ukraine the LLR is limited to Ukraine and not the surrounding affected countries.

The review's purpose is to generate evidence and learn how to best further strengthen Movement coordination in large-scale emergencies. It focuses on the process of implementing SMCC, to identify what worked well and less well, and why.

The review will focus on the SMCC spirit of collaboration, as well as on the implementation of SMCC tools. It will consider the impact of SMCC on operations in areas outlined in the COD resolution CD/19/R9 and in the subsequent Plan of Action to improve coordination and complementarity (non-competition). The review will engage with respective Movement partners involved in the selected emergency responses i.e., the IFRC, the ICRC, and National Societies, to understand a wider set of views and reflect on the range of challenges and opportunities.

The Consultant/LLR Team will solicit the views of the following key stakeholders in each of the various locations.

- HNS, PNS, IFRC, and ICRC Leadership
- Management, operations, and technical staff at the headquarters of the ICRC, and the IFRC Geneva and Regions
- Management and staff in the delegations or offices of the ICRC and the IFRC in the selected countries
- Governance, management, and staff of the National Societies in the selected countries (at the HQ and branch levels in the selected countries and as applicable)

The timeframe of this LLR is from April to November 2023, with a draft final report to be sent to the Steering Committee by October 2023, for further discussion and comments.

Lessons from the exercise should aim to be specific and realistic to inform the future direction and substance of this joint endeavor of the Movement. The senior management of the ICRC and IFRC in coordination with the Leadership of National Societies will then discuss and decide on global next steps, priorities, and future commitments. The findings of the review will contribute to informing and framing the way forward for Movement coordination in future large-scale emergencies and providing inputs to a

possible new SMCC Resolution. Findings will also be used to report on SMCC implementation of the current COD period.

LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW OBJECTIVES

The review will focus on the areas outlined below. In each case, the consultant will analyze the data available, and draw out findings on positive practices and those that could be improved. The consultant will suggest possible options and learnings for the future working of SMCC. The consultant should consider possible options for systemic and operational solutions to address identified shortcomings/challenges and any other re-orientations that could improve the process and outcomes. These will be presented to management for decision-making.

The lessons learned review draws primarily on the Movement/SMCC criterion of “coordination” below and evaluates whether coordination has contributed to “effectiveness” and “efficiency”. However, the review will not perform an in-depth assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Movement response. The review will also consider the criterion of “relevance” in the context of the guidance and tools and their relevance to supporting Movement coordination.

Focus areas

- Assess the extent to which the Movement components are fulfilling their **commitment to strengthen coordination and cooperation** in emergency operations and across the various areas of focus of the SMCC initiative.
- Identify whether the following SMCC ambitions are relevant and how much they have been fulfilled in both selected emergencies
 - Ambition 1: Change practice and behavior through promotion and increased awareness of coordination
 - Ambition 2: Deliver well-coordinated and predictable operational responses
 - Ambition 3: Communication and fundraising efforts of the Movement are well-coordinated and framed
- Identify **key enablers and challenges** in the implementation of SMCC at the various levels (country, regional, headquarters).
- Assess the **relevance** of the guidance and tools that have been developed to support Movement coordination since the onset of the SMCC initiative, especially the Mini-Summit and the 3 levels of coordination mechanisms.
- Propose recommendations for further strengthening the implementation of **the SMCC** in current and future responses to crises.

The framework for analysis of SMCC 2.0 is the set of 6 priorities as outlined above and in the SMCC Resolution CD 22/21 form a basis of criteria for this lessons learning review. It is anticipated that the LLR will look across the 6 themes and – to be determined in the inception phase – identify if there are one or more themes that would be particularly important for a deep dive.

LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The results of the lessons learned review will inform current and future coordination efforts of the Movement. The data collection in the field contexts may be conducted remotely if field visits are seen to be feasible. The engagement with Ukraine and Pakistan field contexts will be sequenced rather than conducted in parallel, depending on the availability of in-country staff, and the capacity and make-up of the team conducting the review. The review methodology will be a mainly qualitative inquiry based on the criteria set out in this TOR, with key questions developed by the consultant(s). Data and reporting that reflect the SMCC components will be made available.

The methodology will include the following steps:

- i. **Initial briefing and secondary data** will be provided to the consultant at the outset. This and selected key informant interviews will be used to develop the inception report.
- ii. **Desk review** of organizational, strategic, policy, and operational documents of the ICRC, the IFRC, and the NSs (where applicable) - relevant to Movement coordination globally and of the operational response in the selected contexts.
- iii. **Two field visits** to the focus countries (Ukraine and Pakistan) (see section 3). The field visits will provide a “reality check” on the implementation of Movement coordination, as well as an opportunity for learning.
- iv. **Interviews with key internal and external stakeholders** involved in Movement coordination. This will cover a full range of key staff across locations, including ICRC and IFRC Geneva and

Regional / Country offices for the relevant countries, the NSs in those contexts, plus NSs working internationally in-country or involved as donors. The interviews will also cover all levels of involvement, including senior management, staff (Movement Cooperation, Operations, etc.), and volunteers, where relevant. Management and staff from relevant external donors and/or humanitarian actors may also be interviewed as appropriate. Interviews will be confidential, and records will be kept by the consultant unless interviewees agree to share them.

TIMEFRAME

The LLR should be completed at the earliest, and no later than November 2023. Below is a draft list of expected activities. Specific timings of deliverables will be agreed upon in consultation with ICRC and IFRC management.

LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW DELIVERABLES AND SUCCESS FACTORS

The review will seek the following deliverables:

- i. **A 1-page briefing** outlining the purpose, timing, and key messages to explain the evaluation process to stakeholders. This acts as a communication tool internally within the evaluation, particularly during the data collection phase. It includes the contact details of the evaluators, the evaluation managers, and the IFRC and ICRC's integrity weblinks.
- ii. **Draft and final inception report (max 8 pages plus annexes) with PPT** detailing a proposed methodology, evaluation matrix, list of stakeholders to be consulted, work plan and timeline, and the tools for data collection to be presented to the Coordination Group for validation.
- iii. **PPT presentation per context** of the key findings and lessons learned for **Debriefings / feedback to stakeholders in the field and at headquarters** - The consultant(s) ensures regular exchanges with the JMT. The consultant(s) will debrief with NS, ICRC, and IFRC management when leaving the field and in Geneva, at the end of the data collection process. These debriefs will serve as an opportunity to maintain transparency and communication around the process, to be inclusive of the Movement actors, and to check and validate the accuracy of the findings.
- iv. **Draft and Final Report – Maximum 25 pages excluding annexes.**
 - a. Part 1: Synthesis
 - b. Part 2: Lessons learned in Ukraine context
 - c. Part 3: Lessons learned in Pakistan context

These should address the purpose and focus areas in the Terms of Reference, and any additional, emergent questions identified during the lessons learned review. The report should include a background to the exercise, a description of the methods and limitations, key findings, lessons learned, possible options, and an executive summary to provide a succinct and clear overview of the report **which can also stand on its own**. The report should also include appropriate appendices (e.g., a copy of the TOR). The draft report will be submitted according to the timeframe and both the ICRC and IFRC will respond with comments according to the deadline outlined above, to enable the consultant to finalize the report on time.

- v. **Communication Product** - The consultant will also produce a communication tool (PowerPoint or synthesis with visuals) to help the SMCC team communicate the findings and the way forward to Movement components leadership and other audiences.

All written deliverables are owned by the ICRC and the IFRC and the consultant will not be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of it as his/her own work or to make use of the lessons learned review results for private publication purposes. The report of the lessons learned review and/or a summary of the evaluation (for example, the Executive Summary of the report and/or the communication product) will be published on the ICRC website in line with the ICRC's Access to Information Policy and on the [IFRC Evaluation Databank](#) in support of organizational learning and accountability.

EVALUATION MANAGEMENT

The consultants will report to the Joint Evaluation Management Team, consisting of:

- Head of Operational Membership and Movement Coordination, IFRC
- Head of MOV Division, ICRC,

- SMCC Coordination Group, ICRC
- SMCC Coordination Group, IFRC
- IFRC Coordinator, Monitoring and Evaluation
- ICRC Head of Evaluation Office

The consultant will report to the JMT on a regular basis and, if there is anything that requires clarification, verification of budgetary sign-off., The JMT will keep all stakeholders informed of progress or of any issues encountered, as and when required. Members of the Steering Committee of the SMCC process, Under Secretary General National Society Development and Operations Coordination (NSDOC), IFRC, and Director of Mobilization, Movement and Partnerships (MMP), ICRC, will ensure oversight of the lessons learned review and validation and dissemination of the results.

ETHICS and QUALITY

The consultant must take all reasonable steps to ensure the lessons learned review respects and protects the rights and welfare of the people involved, and to ensure that the review is technically accurate, reliable, legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. It is also expected that the consultant will act during the engagement period in ways compatible with the seven [Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement](#) and with the code(s) of conduct of both the ICRC and IFRC, which documents s/he will be required to sign.

Consultants are required to adhere to international best practices and standards in evaluation. In view of contracting, consultants are required to abide by the ICRC's Professional Standards for Protection Work; the ICRC's Code of Conduct; the ICRC's Code of Ethics for Procurement; and the ICRC Rules on Personal Data Protection.

As a review of coordination rather than a review of the impact on communities, no affected people will contribute directly to the evaluation, and therefore formal Ethical Review Board approval is not required. While the review will not directly consult populations affected by conflict or emergencies, the design and implementation should nevertheless consider and apply the ICRC and IFRC's guiding principles and approach to Accountability to Affected People. However, the review should not entirely exclude the views and experiences of community members if possible, and where there is secondary data it will be made to the review team (for example, perception surveys, service satisfaction surveys, or other reports document the views of community members).

The confidentiality of participating respondents will be protected through anonymization. All primary data plus any sensitive and internal IFRC, ICRC, or NS documentation will be subject to appropriate data protection and management practices. No data or documentation will be shared outside of the contracting supplier without the express permission of the respective organizational owner.

Quality assurance: The main lessons learned deliverables should meet the established quality standards. The quality criteria (checklists) for evaluation products (inception reports and evaluation reports) will be provided to the review team in advance. Drafts of these key products will be quality assured through the ICRC's QA mechanism which will provide feedback to the supplier via the ICRC's Evaluation Office.

Annex B: Case study - SMCC in Ukraine

1. Context, background to SMCC and initial steps

The Russia-Ukraine international armed conflict that escalated on 24 February 2022 has had a devastating impact on the lives of millions of people and continues to do so. Some 5.1 million people (as of May 2023) inside Ukraine are displaced from their homes while over six million people (as of July 2023) are seeking refuge in other countries.¹⁴⁶ From 24 February 2022 to 4 June 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded 24,425 civilian casualties in the country: 8,983 killed and 15,442 injured.¹⁴⁷ Essential infrastructure such as homes, schools, health care facilities, and energy/power installations have been destroyed.¹⁴⁸ Approximately 17.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023.¹⁴⁹



Source: URCS One Plan 2023-2025.

The URCS – supported by the IFRC and many NSs – and the ICRC have been, and continue to be, at the forefront of the response in Ukraine.¹⁵⁰ The RCRC Movement components, including ICRC, IFRC and NSs, have been responding to the humanitarian needs in Ukraine, in bordering countries, and in places where people who have fled from violence have settled. Fifty-eight (58) NSs have been providing on-the-ground, remote, financial, and in-kind support to those impacted.¹⁵¹

Ukraine has been an SMCC flagship context ('laboratory') since 2016. When the situation turned

¹⁴⁶ <https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/>

¹⁴⁷ <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukrainian-crisis-situational-analysis-20-june-2023>

¹⁴⁸ <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/russia-ukraine-international-armed-conflict-red-cross-red-crescent-response-one-year>

¹⁴⁹ <https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/>

¹⁵⁰ IFRC and ICRC. The Russia-Ukraine international armed conflict: One year of the global Red Cross Red Crescent Movement response. 2022.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

into an emergency, SMCC kicked in and a Mini-Summit (24.2.22) was held. Two Joint Statements were released (26.2.22 and 29.7.22), and the deployment of a MCO (16.3.22-20.5.22) was agreed. A joint IFRC/ICRC Movement Log Hub was established to assist the URCS and the NSs in bordering countries.¹⁵² Due to the overwhelming magnitude of the emergency, security management arrangements did not evolve as desired with much of the dysfunctionality being attributed to GVA IFRC and ICRC disagreements and competition. This hindered the initial stages of the response¹⁵³ and subsequently caused the various PNSs to begin direct service provision within the country, albeit haphazardly and without clear URCS coordination.¹⁵⁴

The key SMCC stages are set out below.

2. Movement Coordination Agreement and Movement Contingency Plan

The MCA for Ukraine was agreed on 12 February 2021, and was appreciated for its enabling role prior to the emergency, permitting structured dialogue on the strengths, limitations and opportunities emerging through the development process, and providing a lens on how the partnership needed to evolve to meet the contained aspirations and initial response preparations. However, the MCA was felt to be overly subject to how 'personalities' chose to interpret roles.

Movement contingency and preparedness meetings had been organized on a regular basis from early January 2022, sharing analysis, information and respective organizations contingency plans but no specific MCP was developed for Ukraine prior to the emergency (rather a NS contingency plan to which partners contributed, focusing on safety and security). Given the rapidly changing dynamics in Ukraine, it was simply felt too complicated and unrealistic to develop a full MCP.

3. Convenor and co-convenor roles

The Ukraine Joint Statements¹⁵⁵ set out the convenor and co-convenor role. While many KIs were complimentary about the URCS overall response performance, not all felt it was playing its 'full' convenor role as per the MCA/Joint Statement. This was attributed to stretched/limited NS senior management capacity that impacted ability to convene and attend strategic platform meetings. This said, URCS senior management was feted for continuing to show SMCC leadership even as the conflict unfolded. At times, URCS preferred to engage bilaterally with PNSs as a means of leveraging resources and avoiding dealing with often disparate agendas.¹⁵⁶

ICRC was deemed co-convenor, with IFRC taking that title in the surrounding countries.¹⁵⁷ The Seville Agreement 2.0 and a new Joint Statement in July outlined security approaches between URCS, IFRC and ICRC and clarified how IFRC could provide Integration Agreements to PNS, under ICRC security.¹⁵⁸

The Movement coordination structure in Ukraine is depicted below.

152 Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC 2.0) PROGRESS REPORT May 2022.

153 Source: IFRC IOR Ukraine and Impacted Countries report (March 2023).


154 *Ibid.*

155 There were two Joint Statements: one before the adoption of the Seville Agreement 2.0 (February 2022) and at the end of July, taking into account Seville Agreement 2.0. This is important to highlight as the roles and responsibilities of each partner during the emergency phase between the two dates was based on the first Joint Statement.

156 It was reported that the Movement in Ukraine is perceived as being heavy, labour intensive, not always solution orientated, nor providing the required technical support/expertise, which can make the Movement less attractive than other international partners.

157 Belarus - there was no mini summit and no activation of MCCIA. Moldova - there was a mini summit in March 2022 and a decision table. There is no mention of the convenor and co convenor roles as the MCCIA was adopted in June 2022 (ICRC is mentioned as "coordinator in the Transnistria region and IFRC as coordinator in Moldova).

158 Source: IFRC IOR Ukraine and Impacted Countries report (March 2023).



The three-level coordination structure was considered highly relevant. However, the strategic platform was not always functional and characterised at times as somewhat dysfunctional due to parties focusing too narrowly on their own institutions' positioning/needs, rather than on 'collective' positioning. In addition, some PNSs felt IFRC strategic platform positioning did not always adequately represent wider PNS interests.

Operational platform functioning in Ukraine was reported to be much better, but at times inhibited by poor strategic information flow from the strategic platform. The MEOPS (figure 1 above) was considered a good enabler for effective coordination and cooperation. Other reports¹⁵⁹ indicate good operational coordination at country level due to first round Surge Ops Managers being experienced in leveraging operational coordination mechanisms. Operational and technical coordination at the regional level, which guided the country level, however, was deemed less effective and attributed to overly complex hierarchies and some redundancy in Movement decision-making contributors.¹⁶⁰ Some technical functions (e.g. mobile health units; mental health and psychological support) performed better than others, but many suffered from a lack of follow on operational coherence post meetings.

4. Mini-Summit and Mini-Summit decision table

Ukraine held two Mini-Summits, the first (24.02.2022) was critical to framing the initial emergency response; the second was a follow-up one (part 1 and 2 -1.4.2022 and 4.4.2022) that helped determine if decisions taken at the initial Mini-Summit remained valid.¹⁶¹ The decision table contained clear outcomes captured from the Mini-Summit process, which were shared with Movement partners that had a special interest in the operation. The Mini-Summit process for Ukraine was rated as highly relevant aided by having a clear, simple, understandable, and accessible range of tools; as well as the MCO 'who helped put everything in place'.¹⁶² This process was felt to have contributed to a better coordinated response than would have otherwise been possible.

¹⁵⁹ IFRC IOR Ukraine and Impacted Countries report March 2023.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ An updated scope of involvement followed: URCS leads in areas of Ukraine that are less affected by intense military operations, in the fields of emergency response activities including Health, Cash, RFL and Relief efforts, supported by the ICRC as co-convenor, and by IFRC and partners, as requested by URCS. ICRC leads in areas of Ukraine that are affected by intense military operations, supported by URCS as co-convenor, as well as on IHL, protection and detention issues across the whole country.

¹⁶² The fact that the toolkit was refreshed/rebuilt by GVA at the conflict outset greatly assisted meaningful application.

5. Joint Statement

The first (February) Joint Statement confirmed the importance of the SMCC spirit and tools, and was explicit about the volatility of the situation, the lack of clarity as to needs, effective capacities, and partners' ability to operate. Importantly, the 'Ask' requested Movement partners to ensure alignment on public communication around the crisis to project a coherent Movement narrative; and for Movement partners to avoid sending un-solicited goods and/or personnel until expressly agreed by the Movement Strategic Platform. The second (July) Joint Statement¹⁶³ outlined security approaches between URCS, IFRC and ICRC and clarified how IFRC could provide Integration Agreements to PNS, under ICRC security.¹⁶⁴

6. Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisor

A MCO was deployed on 16 March 2022 for 2.5 months. While deployed a little later than desirable, the role was considered highly relevant, well received/appreciated by partners, and seen as a positive contribution to the emergency response. The MCO faced key challenges including: broader Movement politics relating to Seville 2.0 discussions; different ICRC/IFRC planning and mobilisation timeframes; triple reporting lines to the NS Secretary General and heads of IFRC/ICRC in-country structures; the perceived non-neutrality of the MCO (by some); and the NS being unable to take a more leading role on cooperation modalities due to a lack of internal capacity. Further challenges for the MCO in Ukraine related to a lack of PNS delegates with cooperation type specialisms; and the deployment of the IFRC Membership Coordinator for the region adding a level of confusion that some saw as a parallel role with a parallel structure, causing unnecessary competition between ICRC and IFRC Movement coordination mechanisms.¹⁶⁵

7. Working towards Movement-wide data sharing

The IFRC had a wide, open approach to data sharing as seen via its GO Platform.¹⁶⁶ The ICRC's minimal approach to data sharing was however felt to impede the ability to establish an accurate *Movement footprint*, which in turn negatively affected collective efforts for enhancing the operational response (ICRC admitted to challenges in establishing its common response indicators).

PNS commitments to data sharing were overall well intentioned, although some were rated 'more open' to sharing than others. Challenges attributed to ensuring PNSs' contribution to Movement footprint clarity included: (a) unilateral PNS announcements of significant funding increase with limited consideration for impact on wider Movement coordination efforts; (b) exponential PNS funding increases from initial modest levels, increasing pressure to use budgets quickly; (c) PNS geographical work overlapping with ICRC mandated territory and the subsequent security coordination challenges this caused.¹⁶⁷

URCS was felt to have made a best effort to share data with partners - the NS maintained an information dashboard, but the accuracy of this was questionable with aspects duplicating IFRC's GO Platform data.

8. Working towards increasing humanitarian funding

Partner commitments to increase *overall humanitarian funding* were highly necessary to yielding essential funding. However, for some PNSs this had consequences for effective cooperation and coordination - negatively impacting SMCC spirits of 'complementarity', 'non-competition' and 'positioning'. Pressure on PNSs from their own national governments and/or back donors for visibility (pejoratively referred to as 'flag planting') resulted in pressure on the PNSs themselves

163 Joint Statement on contextualization of SA 2.0 implementation in Ukraine.

164 Source: IFRC IOR Ukraine and Impacted Countries report (March 2023).

165 See also: SMCC Review of the Movement Coordination Officer Function. January 2023.

166 <https://go.ifrc.org>

167 It is understood that internal regional coordination meetings are being piloted as a mechanism for helping PNSs manage their footprint in various parts of Ukraine.

to rapidly disburse funds, forgoing some SMCC *principles* in the process, and placing increasing demands on the ICRC to facilitate safer access closer to front lines while ensuring safety/security measures.

URCS was feted for pursuing a SMCC spirit of ‘non-competition’ and reminding partners of the need to work together, in complementarity. However, URCS at times was forced to negotiate separately with PNSs, adopting a pragmatic approach of ‘who has the most funding and moves fastest gets the work’. A lack of ICRC data sharing was also seen to negatively weigh on wider collective efforts to increase the Movement’s *overall humanitarian funding*.

Given the ICRC’s known funding predicament¹⁶⁸, some KIs questioned the lack of proactive amelioration in scoping thematic/geographical areas where partners might offer resource support. The drive for increased funding was also felt to have created an unhealthy level of competition between IFRC and ICRC, ‘contributing to the politization of aid and causing them to become direct competitors for both space and funding’. Other inhibitors included the impact of timely information on an accurate *Movement footprint* caused by the different IFRC and ICRC timelines when budgeting for emergency response, which made it difficult to coordinate appeals and impacting ability to communicate to internal and external stakeholders in order to increase overall humanitarian funding.

9. Changing practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination

The positive extent to which the *coordination spirit* was manifested and fostered across the Movement in Ukraine was primarily felt to be more impactful at country level (including among technical levels/platforms in neighbouring countries), and less so at Regional Office and Geneva levels. *Coordination competencies* at country level were strengthened (primarily through the NS taking the lead and strong coordination platforms such as MEOPs).

10. Delivering well-coordinated and predictable operational responses

Good *operational practice* was clearly supported by SMCC tools and guidance with many partners agreeing that the response would have been far more chaotic without the tools: as one KI summarises: ‘*The response was quite effective and readily attributable to SMCC. Without SMCC it would be a total mess. It provided a really important framework for the operation that would otherwise have been really difficult*’.

Some systems across the Movement were more aligned and interoperable than others, for example logistics. An example of how operational delivery improved accounting for real-time lessons learned was noted following the Nova Kakhovka dam event (the collapse of the dam in southern Ukraine on June 6 resulted in a devastating flood, impacting numerous communities), which, while not perfect, was felt to be more efficiently organised based on learning from the early stages of the response.

11. Movement picture

Three Movement pictures were produced (2.2022-10.2022, 6.2022, 10.2023) along with a more comprehensive Movement overview document.¹⁶⁹ An overall challenge with the tool related to a lack of common data/indicator alignment between the ICRC and the IFRC, which resulted in an only partial picture of collective response and impact. This said, the tool was appreciated for its mobilisation potential and for gathering essential Movement information that would not exist otherwise in any form.


¹⁶⁸ <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/update-icrc-financial-situation>

¹⁶⁹ One year of the Russia-Ukraine international armed conflict (2022). Additional reports were also produced for Ukraine.

Annex C: Case study - SMCC in Pakistan

1. Context, background to SMCC and initial steps

From June to August 2022 unprecedented monsoon rains caused widespread flooding and landslides across Pakistan, affecting millions of people, and triggering one of the country's worst floods in decades. The Government of Pakistan officially declared the floods a national emergency on 25 August 2022. The situation evolved close to a public health crisis, and millions were faced with acute food insecurity.¹⁷⁰



More than 2 million houses were damaged or destroyed leaving approximately 8 million people displaced and approximately 600,000 people living in relief camps. Almost 88 per cent of the destruction of houses occurred in Sindh, which also bore the brunt of the damage to roads and bridges leaving people stranded in many places.

PRCS with Movement-wide support coordinated immediate response assistance in Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Gilgit Baltistan. IFRC facilitated a Movement-wide approach for coordinated assistance with in-country partners including the German Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, Turkish Red Crescent Society, and the ICRC.¹⁷¹

To address response capacity risks, IFRC response tools were activated through the deployment of rapid response personnel, ERUs and emergency recruitment of short term and long-term national staff. A logistics supply chain and procurement plan was put in place with a mobilization table launched at global level with local procurement carried out in tandem to avoid delays.

On the 2 September 2022, just months after the floods started, the PRCS appointed a new chairman, with an acting Secretary General appointed to replace the incumbent.

¹⁷⁰ Emergency Appeal: MDRPK023 6/10/2022.

¹⁷¹ Emergency Appeal: MDRPK023 10/04/2023.

Important context information

Pakistan was a context that exhibited primarily Membership Cooperation (HNS, IFRC and PNSs), with very limited ICRC engagement other than in its exclusive geographical area of operation.

It is important to clarify that in Pakistan none of the SMCC tools other than the MCA and Joint Statement were activated, thus helping explain limited Pakistan analysis.

A lack of stage/tool implementation should be judged in a context that:

- a. the incoming PRCS Chairman was new to the Movement and likely had limited understanding of the Seville Agreement 2.0 and SMCC 2.0
- b. an acting Secretary General was appointed who had limited autonomy
- c. there was little effort within PRCS, as convenor, to operationalise the SMCC initiative or deploy any tools.

In mitigation, it might be said that SMCC was simply not a priority for the NS, which focused efforts primarily on relief distribution.

The IFRC Head of Delegation attempted to remind the NS of its convenor obligations and of SMCC in general, but limited NS human resources, a focus on relief distribution, and the change in Chairmanship meant little traction was gained.

The key SMCC stages are set out below.

2. Movement Coordination Agreement and Movement Contingency Plan

The initial MCA process was not a smooth one. In Pakistan, the MCA was signed before the Seville Agreement 2.0 came into effect - as such, the co-convenor/convenor roles are not found in the MCA. Furthermore, the flood emergency took place a few months after the Seville Agreement 2.0 was adopted, meaning that roles and responsibilities were largely unclear too many, if not all, Movement components. A series of 'miscommunications and misunderstandings' resulted in the intended MCA template based on the current Ukraine example being overlooked for a much older version that showed ICRC in the lead role.

The final agreed MCA was signed on June 2022 (valid until 31 December 2025). The country Operational Strategy was revised on 17 October 2022 reflecting a Federation-wide plan, integrating all Membership efforts under one plan led by the PRCS, and aiming for complementarity and collaboration. The 16-month strategy addressed both immediate needs as well as recovery and resilience-building of the affected population, aiming to reach 1 million people.¹⁷²

Pre-crisis preparedness measures appeared more informal in nature and not comprehensive, with KIs noting that there had been a much 'tighter relationship' between IFRC emergency operations and PRCS emergency operations in previous emergencies. While no MCP was developed for Pakistan, PRCS were reported to have been working on a 'preparedness operation plan' with partner support, but coordination challenges between PRCS HQ and its branches meant little progress had been made. The SMCC Movement Checklist had been used as a preparation approach pre-crisis, however, due to the NS leadership change at the height of the emergency much preparation work undertaken fell by the wayside.¹⁷³

While KIs in general felt NS leadership issues severely affected partners' ability to respond to the emergency, this should not have come as any surprise. Reports dating back to 2019 indicated

¹⁷² Source: Operation Update Pakistan Monsoon Flood Emergency. 10 April 2023.

¹⁷³ In 2018, a Preparedness for Effective Response (PER) review was undertaken, followed in 2019 by a full assessment. The NS recorded only a 2 per cent score in the high-performance capacity range.

that: (a) NS leadership on critical emergency processes was inadequate; (b) Movement partners were unable to effectively engage with PRCS leadership; and (c) PRCS leadership was unaware of how to scale-up in response to crisis/conflict situations.¹⁷⁴

Given this background, PNSs felt that IFRC missed an opportunity to better lay the ground for an effective pre-disaster Movement Coordination structure, suggesting that sufficient attention had not been paid to resolving long standing Movement coordination and cooperation issues. This attention gap also extended to PNSs feeling that they were not always sufficiently represented by the IFRC in-country, nor kept informed about key PRCS integrity issues.¹⁷⁵ Movement coordination lapses cannot be solely attributed to IFRC. Some KIs felt the ICRC was at times 'absent' from coordination issues, in part attributed to (perceived or real): the incoming Head of Delegation not fully empowered to make decisions¹⁷⁶; the ICRC scaling down its work in Pakistan; and uncertainty as to what the ICRC could offer the broader emergency response or the value it could bring to the operation.

3. Convenor and co-convenor roles

PRCS did not play its *convenor* role and was not at the 'centre' of the emergency response as per Seville Agreement 2.0 aspirations (but noting that the emergency in Pakistan took place just after the approval of the Seville Agreement 2.0). While noting that the change of PRCS leadership took place in the midst of the operation, leadership/senior management made little attempt to implement SMCC tools nor convened/attended any strategic platform meetings. This was attributed in part to: (a) PRCS not fully understanding what its convenor role was within the emergency response (a situation exacerbated by the incoming PRCS Chairman's newness to the NS/RCRC Movement and subsequent over focus on Sindh province for response efforts); (b) a change of Secretary General; and (c) a lack of SMCC tool dissemination across all partners. In the Joint Statement IFRC was deemed *co-convenor*, however, in the absence of PRCS playing the convenor role, the other partners looked to the IFRC to enact a more systematic roll-out of SMCC tools.

The Movement Coordination structure in Pakistan was ad hoc and not formalised. As previously stated, PRCS as convenor enabled no strategic platform meetings during the emergency (despite attempts by IFRC as co-convenor to encourage this). Instead, PNSs looked to IFRC to take a more lead role (akin to convenor) but this did not materialise. In the absence of progress, a number of 'trust' issues began to emerge between IFRC and PNSs. This contributed to various communication gaps that were not aided by the NS Chairman directly liaising with the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva, and which was seen to undermine the IFRC HoD's authority.

Operational platform meetings were ad hoc in nature with PRCS attending only a limited number often due to staff being overwhelmed with response efforts as well as being 'triple-hatted'.¹⁷⁷ Meetings were often 'strategically decision compromised' as the acting PRCS Secretary General was unable to take any decisions without onward referral to the NS Chairman.

4. Mini-Summit and Mini-Summit decision table

No Mini-Summit was held. Instead, an initial series of bi-lateral meetings between PRCS and IFRC took place, which further exacerbated the PNS communication/trust issues described earlier (PNSs felt IFRC should have first met with them rather than the NS, as a means of being able to present both a collective front to the NS and a joint partner situational understanding of the emergency and outline response strategisation).

174 IFRC and ICRC NSD in Emergencies report (2019); and ICRC/PRCS SAF PoA Review Workshop 2019 Report.

175 The example of two trucks of aid being diverted to a private residence being given by many KIs, which was beyond IFRC's control.

176 The previous HoD was re-deployed to the Ukraine crisis.

177 Partners made best attempts to support the NS to recruit new staff to support the emergency response, but these offers were not taken up.

5. Joint Statement

A Joint Statement was produced on 21 October 2022 some four months after the emergency began, a delay which was felt to have contributed to coordination misinterpretations and a lack of clarity as to how the emergency response would be managed.¹⁷⁸ While the fact that no Mini-Summit was held certainly impeded timely Joint Statement development, once developed, it was seen as relevant for informing the outside world and better showcasing to partners a collective Movement. However, due to the delay its usefulness in helping frame the response was questioned.

6. Movement Coordination in Operations' Advisor

A MCO was not requested for Pakistan largely due to limited ICRC operations in the main flood response areas and limited overall Movement coordination modalities/needs.

7. Working towards Movement-wide data sharing

The IFRC's GO Platform¹⁷⁹ has a section for the Pakistan emergency, but this acts more as a document library and less real-time data window thus questioning its utility during the emergency operation.¹⁸⁰ At country level, the IFRC Country Office produces Federation-wide Situation Reports, demonstrating the collective support of the IFRC Membership towards the affected population. In coordination with PNSs and ICRC, the Country Office also provides technical support to PRCS for its PRCS Floods Response Plan.

However, amongst in-country partners (ICRC, IFRC, and PNSs), data sharing during the flood emergency was characterised as being infrequent, informal and unstructured, thus making contribution to Movement footprint clarity difficult. PRCS shared little operational response data with its partners and was overall characterised as being 'very poor' in this regard.

8. Working towards increasing humanitarian funding

IFRC launched a Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF) operation at the end of July 2022, expanding the operation with a second allocation request in August 2022. As the situation worsened, IFRC launched an IFRC Secretariat Emergency Appeal of 25 million Swiss francs to expand PRCS response over a 16-month period, which included a third DREF allocation to the total DREF loan to 1 million Swiss francs. In October 2022, IFRC revised its Emergency Appeal to 40 million Swiss francs (IFRC Secretariat) and 55 million Swiss francs (Federation-wide), aiming to reach over 1 million people affected by the floods.¹⁸¹ As there was no Coordinated Appeal process for Pakistan, it was not possible to ascertain ICRC's approach to increasing humanitarian funding in relation to the emergency response.

Assessing overall commitments to resource mobilization and the localization agenda in Pakistan was complicated, not least because the PRCS was not a lead or full partner in the alignment process (and largely ignored Movement country coordinating mechanisms). Ensuring coherent resource mobilization in Pakistan was also negatively affected by reports that PRCS found the ICRC's predictable funding model more attractive than the IFRC's 'less predictable' one.

9. Changing practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination

Changing practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination in Pakistan was primarily through a *spirit of coordination* rather than through the formal application of SMCC processes or tools. While PNSs did not consider this an ideal substitute for direct tool application, they nonetheless noted, as did IFRC, that the SMCC 'spirit' kept them all moving

¹⁷⁸ One non-in country PNS commented on how challenging it was to find out who was involved in the various coordination levels, particularly the key operational one.

¹⁷⁹ <https://www.ifrc.org/happening-now/emergencies/ifrc-go> Its aim is to help the IFRC's network better meet the needs of affected communities.

¹⁸⁰ For example, it omits the indicator tracking tool inputs associated with the Ukraine crisis.

¹⁸¹ Emergency Appeal: MDRPK023 10/04/2023

forward in the absence of any meaningful PRCS engagement and direction.

Relevant to the Pakistan floods was the coordination spirit shown within the IFRC APRO, which while good was felt limited to senior echelons (the intervention of IFRC APRO senior management reasonably early in the crisis to help address some of the coordination challenges was appreciated). Coordination between the relevant ICRC and IFRC Regional Offices was considered mixed: at times rated good (particularly presently, but primarily outside of the Pakistan context), but also non-optimal past examples being given that included a lack of coordination on appeals processes.¹⁸²

10. Delivering well-coordinated and predictable operational responses

Early operational delivery was significantly enhanced by drawing on lessons learned from previous flood operations (as evidenced by reference to the Flood Response in Pakistan 2022 lessons learning log from 2014 onwards). Good interoperability practice was also exhibited through IFRC and Norwegian Red Cross requesting ICRC Logs to facilitate medicine procurement/importation for PRCS Mobile Health Units. Good interoperability cooperation levels were also reported for ERU coordination.

Unfortunately, ambitions to delivering well-coordinated and predictable operational response was negatively affected by the NSs preferred approach to engaging bilaterally with PNSs (referred to as 'divide and rule') as a means of leveraging resources and avoiding dealing with often disparate agendas.¹⁸³ Unfortunately, such practices led to coordination inefficiencies as evidenced by PNSs duplicating support/deployments to the country. Ambitions for this aim were also thwarted by the long delays in deployed delegates obtaining 'non-objection certificates' to travel to affected flood areas, meaning some 35 Movement personnel were 'stuck' in Karachi for weeks. Once they were able to travel, there was a subsequent bottleneck of trainings for NS staff which adversely affected operational response efficiencies.

No significant security issues related to SMCC were raised in the Pakistan context, with any incidents cited taking place in a Membership context.

11. Movement picture

No Movement pictures were produced.

182 Sri Lanka complex emergency: <https://www.ifrc.org/emergency/sri-lanka-complex-emergency>

183 One PRCS KI responded to this by noting: 'The NS has to follow up with PNSs directly because IFRC doesn't take any lead in coordinating them. This creates extra work for us – we would rather have a single reporting process than multiple ones'.

Annex D: Review Matrix

Main review questions	Sub-questions	Data sources and collection methods ¹⁸⁴
Focus Area 1. Coordination - fulfilling SMCC commitment / enablers and challenges		
1.1. To what extent are the Movement components fulfilling their commitment to strengthen coordination and cooperation in emergency operations and across the various areas of focus of the SMCC initiative? Areas of focus: i. Data management ii. Systems interoperability iii. Movement component capacity iv. Movement response readiness v. Domestic/international response vi. Enhancing scalability	1.1.1. With regard to the <u>ICRC</u>, to what extent is it fulfilling its commitment to strengthen coordination and cooperation in emergency operations? To what extent is it doing so in Ukraine and in Pakistan? 1.1.2. With regard to the <u>IFRC</u>, to what extent is it fulfilling its commitment to strengthen coordination and cooperation in emergency operations? To what extent is it doing so in Ukraine and in Pakistan? 1.1.3. With regard to the <u>NSS</u>, to what extent are they fulfilling their commitments to strengthen coordination and cooperation in emergency operations? To what extent are they doing so in Ukraine and in Pakistan? 1.1.4. With regard to the <u>URCS</u> and the <u>PRCS</u>, to what extent are they fulfilling their commitments to strengthen coordination and cooperation in emergency operations? 1.1.5. What are the key <u>enablers</u> to effective coordination generally, and in Ukraine and in Pakistan? 1.1.6. What are the main <u>challenges</u> to effective coordination generally, and in Ukraine and in Pakistan?	KIIs Document review KIIs Document review KIIs Document review KIIs Document review KIIs Document review KIIs Document review

¹⁸⁴ Not exhaustive, data may be gathered from complementary sources.

Focus Area 2. Ambition <i>relevance</i> and fulfilment in both selected emergencies (plus efficiency and effectiveness)		
2.1. How relevant have the following SMCC ambitions been and how much they have been fulfilled in both selected emergencies: ○ Ambition 1: Change practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination ○ Ambition 2: Deliver well-coordinated and predictable operational responses ○ Ambition 3: Reinforce the visibility of the collective response	2.1.1. In both Ukraine and in Pakistan, what was the level of understanding of Movement coordination and the SMCC process? How did this hamper or enhance collective impact? How has awareness grown thanks to the operation? What have been the key enablers/challenges been at country, region, and headquarters levels?	KIIs KIIs/document review
	2.1.2. In both Ukraine and Pakistan, how strong has the focus been on changing practice and behaviour through <u>promotion and increased awareness of coordination</u>? How has this been done and to what extent has it been fulfilled? What have been the key enablers/challenges at country, region, and headquarters levels?	KIIs KIIs/document review KIIs/document review
	2.1.3. In both Ukraine and in Pakistan, how <u>coordinated and predictable was the operational response</u>? How has this been done and to what extent has it been fulfilled? What have been the key enablers/challenges at country, region, and headquarters levels?	KIIs KIIs/document review KIIs/document review
	2.1.4. In both Ukraine and in Pakistan, how well coordinated was <u>reinforcing the visibility of the collective response</u>? How has this been done and to what extent has it been fulfilled? What have been the key enablers/challenges at country, region, and headquarters levels?	KIIs/document review/online survey KIIs/document review/online survey KIIs/document review/online survey

	2.1.5. In Pakistan/Ukraine, to what extent has the SMCC initiative been efficient in facilitating the better use of Movement resources (funds, expertise, and time) at operational levels. 2.1.6. To what extent has the SMCC initiative been effective in achieving its intended coordination objectives and its operational impact? 2.1.7. To what extent has the SMCC initiative been efficient in facilitating the better use of Movement resources (funds, expertise, and time) at operational levels?	KIIs/document review/online survey KIIs/document review/online survey
3. Relevance of SMCC tools and guidance		
3.1. How relevant have the guidance and tools that have been developed to support Movement coordination since the onset of the SMCC initiative, especially the Mini-Summit and the 3 levels of coordination mechanisms?	3.1.1. How relevant have each of the SMCC tools been in improving Movement Coordination – in general, and in Pakistan and in Ukraine? • Mini-summit • Mini-summit decision table • Joint Statement • MCO • Movement Coordination Agreement (MCA) • Movement Picture • Coordinated appeals • Movement Contingency Plan (if exist) What have been the enablers and/or inhibitors to effective tool implementation? 3.1.2. How relevant has the Mini-Summit been in shaping the coordination and the collective response in Pakistan and in Ukraine? What have been the enablers and/or inhibitors? 3.1.3. How relevant have the 3 levels of coordination mechanisms (strategic, operational, and technical) been in reinforcing Movement coordination in Pakistan and in Ukraine? What have been the enablers and/or inhibitors?	KIIs/document review/online survey KIIs/document review/online survey KIIs/document review/online survey KIIs/document review KIIs/document review/online survey

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Annex F: Key informants

Function (past or current)	Organisation
Deputy Regional Director for Movement Affairs – Africa	ICRC
Head of Project - SMCC	ICRC
Director Mobilization, Movement and Partnership	ICRC
Head of Movement Cooperation	ICRC
Head of Collective Impact Initiative	ICRC
Movement Ukraine Crisis Team Member	ICRC retiree
Head of Operations	ICRC
Deputy Head of Movement Division	ICRC
Deputy Director Operations	ICRC
Head of Delegation Ukraine 2022	ICRC
Head of Delegation Ukraine 2023	ICRC
Head of Cooperation Sector Eurasia	ICRC
Movement Ukraine Crisis Team Member	ICRC
Participating National Societies Rapid Deployment	ICRC
Head of Surge Unit	ICRC
Deputy Head of Delegation Partnership / Head of Operations	ICRC
Former Cooperation Coordinator	ICRC
Movement Coordination Officer	Movement
Cooperation Coordinator Pakistan	ICRC
Head of Delegation Pakistan	ICRC
Head of Cooperation Sector Asia-Pacific	ICRC
Operations Coordinator Eurasia	ICRC
Supra Regional Cooperation Coordinator	ICRC
Cooperation Coordinator Ukraine	ICRC
Health Coordinator	ICRC
Under Secretary General - National Society Development and Operations Coordination	IFRC
Head - Operational Membership and Movement Coordination	IFRC
Lead, Surge Capacity	IFRC
Snr. Officer, Emergency Appeals and Marketing	IFRC
Manager, X Media Campaign	IFRC
Senior Officer, SMCC	IFRC
Coordinator, Supply Chain in Emergencies	IFRC
Regional Director, Europe	IFRC
Head of Delegation Ukraine	IFRC
Head Emergency Operations	IFRC
Senior Advisor, Global Security - Security Unit	IFRC
Head Integrated Service	IFRC
Ops Manager Surge	IFRC
HSD Membership Coordinator	IFRC
HEOPs Pakistan	IFRC / Canadian RC
Head HDCC	IFRC - APRO
Operation Manager	IFRC - APRO
Coordinator, Large Scale Disaster and Crises	IFRC - APRO
Deputy Regional Director	IFRC - APRO
Senior Officer, Regional Risk Management	IFRC - APRO
Ex-Manager Hum. Affairs and Strategic Engagement	IFRC - Pakistan
Head of Delegation	IFRC - Pakistan
Ops Coordinator	IFRC - Pakistan
Operational Activities and Response Coordinator	URCS

Head of Kyiv Region Branch	URCS
Head of Disaster Risk Reduction	Pakistan Red Crescent
Head PMER	Pakistan Red Crescent
Head OD	Pakistan Red Crescent
Country Representative	Canadian Red Cross
Head of German Red Cross Pakistan	German Red Cross
Head of Norwegian Red Cross Pakistan	Norwegian Red Cross
Operations Manager	Swedish Red Cross
Country Manager	British Red Cross - APRO
Operation Manager Pakistan	German Red Cross
Country Manager Ukraine	Danish Red Cross
Country Representative Ukraine	German Red Cross

Annex G: Key informant questions and protocol

Lessons Learning Review of Movement Coordination in Operations Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) Ukraine and Pakistan

To help you prepare for the interview, please find below the range of interview questions that I would like to ask.

As it will not always be possible to cover all of the questions within the time available, please select those that you feel are most relevant to you and for which you have the most information to share.

If you have any insights into the SMCC initiative in the Pakistan and/or Ukraine contexts, please also feel free to share any views.

Interviews are confidential and nothing will be attributed to you personally. Any quotations used in the review report will be anonymised. Please allow 60-75 minutes for the interview.

The 6 SMCC Priorities:

- Ensuring Movement-wide consistent data management to enhance operational response, ensure accountability, and provide timely information on the Movement footprint to internal and external stakeholders, to increase our overall humanitarian funding as well as reinforce the relevance and visibility of Movement operations
- Pursuing the development of the interoperability of systems to ensure agile and flexible support to operations
- Understanding and utilizing the capacities of Movement components to contribute to a response, including the domestic competencies of National Societies (NSs), to ensure services are provided efficiently and meet the required standard of quality
- Ensuring Movement readiness for response by employing existing SMCC tools to promote common planning and analysis and coordinated activities, reflecting on whether other tools are required, developing an evidence base on what works well in coordination, and considering different operational models to suit different contexts
- Promoting complementary domestic and international response while ensuring the coherent and sustained development of local capacities, including in resource mobilization and in alignment with the localization agenda, emphasizing the need for operations that are as local as possible and as international as necessary
- Enhancing the scalability of the response in large-scale crises in a manner that reinforces the position of the Movement as a key global responder.

Focus Area 1. Coordination - fulfilling SMCC commitment / enablers and challenges

1.1.1. To what extent do you feel the Movement components are fulfilling their commitment to strengthen coordination and cooperation in emergency operations (globally) across the SMCC priority areas (please see above for fuller description of the 6 priorities)? Please share views on ICRC, IFRC and NSs.

What have been the key enablers? What have been the key challenges?

1.1.2. **Ukraine/Pakistan** - to what extent are the Movement components fulfilling their commitment to strengthen coordination and cooperation in emergency operations across the SMCC priority areas?

1.1.3. To what extent do you feel that partners are adhering to the SMCC spirit.¹⁸⁵ Please consider:

¹⁸⁵ SMCC spirit is described as follows in the Movement Coordination Agreement: "We will work in complementarity, collaboration and non-competition, ensuring predictability and adopting a no-surprise behaviour. In our daily work, we will endeavour to co-create the ambition of our collective response and a coherent Movement voice, positioning

- a. Complementarity
- b. Collaboration
- c. Non-competition
- d. Predictability
- e. Positioning
- f. [Being] Solution focused
- g. Accountability
- h. Local proactivity
- i. Transparency

What have been the key enablers? What have been the key challenges?

1.1.4. **Pakistan/Ukraine**, please share any views (positive and negative) on fulfilling SMCC priority commitments.

Focus Area 2. Ambition relevance and fulfilment in both selected emergencies

The SMCC initiative has three ambitions:

Ambition 1: Change practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination.

Ambition 2: Deliver well-coordinated and predictable operational responses.

Ambition 3: Reinforce the visibility of the collective response.

2.1.1. In **Ukraine/Pakistan**, how strong has the focus been on changing practice and behaviour through promotion and increased awareness of coordination?

- To what extent do you feel the coordination spirit is embedded and fostered across the Movement?
- To what extent do you feel staff's coordination competencies have been strengthened and accountability for coordination has been increased across the Movement?

How has this been done and to what extent has it been fulfilled?

What have been the key enablers at country, region, and headquarters levels?

What have been the key challenges at country, region, and headquarters levels?

2.1.2. In **Ukraine/Pakistan**, how well-coordinated and predictable was the operational response?

- To what extent do you feel operational practice is supported by relevant tools and guidance?
- To what extent do you feel systems across the Movement are better connected?
- To what extent do you feel operational delivery has improved taking into account lessons learnt?

How has this been done and to what extent has it been fulfilled?

What have been the key enablers at country, region, and headquarters levels?

What have been the key challenges at country, region, and headquarters levels?

2.1.3. In **Ukraine/Pakistan**, how well coordinated was reinforcing visibility of the collective response?

- To what extent do you feel Movement communication and fundraising efforts are well coordinated and framed?
- To what extent do you feel the Movement collective response is portrayed accurately in a timely manner?

ourselves as the Partner of choice in the wider humanitarian system. We will work with a solution-focused mindset, and exercise accountability by ensuring issues are raised and solved in a dialogue at the local level proactively, and elevate them to a higher platform only if local dialogue does not yield an acceptable solution. To reflect the fast-changing context, we will build personal relationships, invest in understanding our organisational differences and identify complementarities. We will be transparent, cognisant that our individual actions can have global consequences and we will regularly evaluate our performance regarding the implementation of this agreement."

How has this been done and to what extent has it been fulfilled?
What have been the key enablers at country, region, and headquarters levels?
What have been the key challenges at country, region, and headquarters levels?

2.1.4. In **Pakistan/Ukraine**, to what extent would you say that the SMCC initiative has been efficient¹⁸⁶ and effective¹⁸⁷ in facilitating the better use of Movement resources (funds, expertise, and time) at operational levels?

2.1.5. **Overall**, to what extent would you say that the SMCC initiative has been effective in achieving its intended coordination objectives.

2.1.6. **Overall**, to what extent would you say that the SMCC initiative has been efficient in facilitating the better use of Movement resources (funds, expertise, and time) at operational levels.

Focus Area 3. Relevance of SMCC tools and guidance / plus Mini-Summit and 3 levels of coordination mechanisms

3.1.1. How relevant/useful have each of the following tools:

1. Mini-summit
2. Mini-summit decision table
3. Joint Statement
4. MCO
5. MCA
6. Movement Picture
7. Coordinated appeals
8. Movement Contingency Plan (if exist)

been in supporting operations – in general, and in Pakistan and in Ukraine?

What have been the enablers to effective tool implementation?

What have been the inhibitors to effective tool implementation?

3.1.2. How relevant has the Mini-Summit been in supporting operations in **Pakistan** and in **Ukraine**?

What have been the enablers?

What have been the inhibitors?

3.1.3. How relevant have the 3 levels of coordination mechanisms (strategic, operational, and technical) been in supporting operations in **Pakistan** and in **Ukraine**?

What have been the enablers?

What have been the inhibitors?

4. General

4.2.1. Based on your overall assessment, do you believe that SMCC coordination efforts have led to greater Movement effectiveness? What example(s) can you share to support your assessment?

4.2.2. Based on your overall assessment, do you believe that SMCC coordination efforts have led to greater Movement efficiencies? What example(s) can you share to support your assessment?

4.2.3. What recommendations/suggestions do you have for further strengthening the implementation of the SMCC in current and future responses to crises.

¹⁸⁶ 'Efficiency' is concerned with the SMCC facilitating better use of Movement resources (funds, expertise, and time) at operational levels.

¹⁸⁷ Effectiveness' is concerned with the extent to which the SMCC initiative has achieved its intended coordination objectives.